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Abstract 
In his study Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities; Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire, Steven Collins 
aptly argues that as society transitioned from the nomadic to the agrarian, imaginaires were 
constructed to provide ideological buttresses for the new political order. Such an imaginaire 
revolved around a set of felicities, that is to say, supplementary imaginary worlds, that promised 
post-mortem rewards  which compensated for worldly injustice. Collins takes as his paradigmatic 
case study the Pali Buddhist world, and in this case, the imaginaire   constituted centres on 
nirvana. As working parts of this imaginaire, the various felicities provided an incentive for  
adhering to socially acceptable behavior, and thus helped maintain stability by compensating those 
who suffered the costs of the agrarian social arrangement.   
  Collins argues that similar systems of felicities could be found in other agrarian states. In a 
previous paper, I applied Collins's theory to Latinate Christianity, with surprising results. Collins’s 
theory was correct, in that Latinate Christianity did share a similar felicity structure; however, 
Latinate Christianity was also greatly preoccupied by Hell, and often contrasted felicities with 
infelicities. In Collins's schema, by contrast, there is little room for infelicities.  
  In this thesis, I intend to re-examine Collins’s argument for the Buddhist case, expanding 
his vision of the Buddhist imaginaire to include a set of infelicities and the structures they 
constitute. Thus, this study will compare infelicities from both the Buddhist imaginaire and the 
Latinate Christian imaginaire. A comparative study presents the potential to create a hypothetical 
structure of infelicities, that may be applicable to infelicities presented in religions outside of 
Buddhism.  
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4 
Introduction 
 
During the second semester of my final year, I was required to read Nirvana and Other 
Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire by Steven Collins. As prescribed reading, this 
text presented a daunting task; even more daunting was unravelling Collins’s seemingly complex 
argument. However, instead of experiencing the confusion I feared, I found myself being drawn 
into Collins’s well-written and thought-provoking study, and this prompted me to write my final 
essay for that course on the topic of 'Imagining Heaven in Agraria'. This was my first attempt to 
apply Collins’s argument regarding felicities to Latinate Christianity, in agrarian Europe. Even after 
completing this essay, however, I still had many questions that required further investigation in 
relation to Collins’s argument. I was particularly interested in how Collins’s argument could be 
expanded or altered to include hells and other infelicities post-mortem fates in the Buddhist and 
Latinate Christian imaginaires. The present thesis is the result of my enquiries into Collins’s 
argument, and of my interest in Buddhist cosmology and imagined worlds, inclusive of the beings 
that exist in such worlds. In this thesis, I will argue for the expansion of Collins’s proposed 
imaginaire to include infelicities.  
 Before I further discuss my intentions, I will outline the limitations and scope of this 
thesis. First, I will address the geographical regions and time-frames covered by my study. Second, 
I will address is the limitations of my own academic abilities. I turn first to the geographic and 
chronological scope of this work. 
In this thesis, I frequently use the term ‘Agraria’ to talk of a place. However, Agraria is not 
a place; rather, it is a term that can be applied to the geographical regions of Asia and Europe. My 
study of Buddhist infelicities spreads from Southern India and Sri Lanka across to Thailand and 
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up into China and Japan. This may seem an impossibly broad scope for a project of this size. 
However, it is my intention to survey Buddhist infelicities broadly, as opposed to focusing on a 
particular region. In doing this I hope to create a study that is useful to the study of religion, as 
opposed to just the study of Buddhism.  
Part of this study is also comparative, and set in the Latinate Christian world, which 
geographically stretches in my study from the Middle East (the origination point of Christianity), 
across to Turkey and up into continental Europe and across even to Ireland. Once again, this is 
broad geographical area of study, which attempts to survey the range of infelicities offered by the 
Christian imaginaire, rather than focus on the specifics of a particular culture’s interpretation of 
infelicities. Not only is my study broad geographically, it also covers a wide expanse of time, given 
that Agraria is not time specific, but refers to a period that humanity entered globally. However, it 
should be noted that humanity did not all enter Agraria at the same, and therefore, we cannot use 
Western constructs relating to time or history to analyse it. Therefore, this thesis will not be 
defined by dates.  
 This thesis is also limited by my own academic abilities, particularly in terms of languages 
and research resources available for this study. I am only able to read in English and French, 
neither of which are primary languages in the area of my study. As a result, I have primarily relied 
on translations or secondary sources that reference primary texts. The study of Buddhism also 
poses a challenge in that a very large quantity of texts is available, and I was thus only able to 
survey a very small selection of texts. 
   
I will give fuller definitions of terms later in this Introduction, but first, I will provide an 
immediate, brief definition here of two words that will appear frequently throughout the 
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Introduction itself. The term ‘Agraria’ refers to a specific time period, defined not by dates but by 
certain civilizational features.1 Imaginaire refers to any texts and ideas that create, discuss or 
propagate any imaginary supplementary world or worlds.2  
 When I examined Collins’s argument in Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of 
the Pali Imaginaire (henceforth referred to as ‘Nirvana...’), I uncovered what I argue are two 
significant flaws. First, Collins does not discuss unfortunate rebirth destinies, such as rebirth in 
hell. I therefore asked where and how unfortunate rebirth fates constituted and contributed to the 
imaginaire proposed by Collins. Collins makes a robust argument that the felicity system and the 
Pali imaginaire acted as a stabilising force throughout the South East Asian Buddhist world. 
However, against Collins, I argue in this thesis that the Buddhist imaginaire is not constituted only 
by felicities. Further, Collins argues that felicity-type structures and imaginaires are found in all 
Agrarian societies. This being the case, his argument also requires alterations to allow for the fact 
that infelicities, in addition to felicities, feature in imaginaires throughout the Agrarian world.  
The felicities of the Buddhist imaginaire are primarily preoccupied with eudemonia—
human happiness or flourishing in both worldly life and post-mortem fates. Happiness in the 
felicitous realms reflects types of happiness and prosperity experienced on earth, but on an 
exorbitant scale, as well as types of special happiness not available on earth. In contrast, infelicities 
are primarily concerned with states of ill-being, predominantly in the afterlife as punishment for 
past sins. Although some of these punishments do reflect tortures and types of violence 
encountered on earth, many represent a special type of violence or a dramatic increase in the level 
of violence over those found or even physically possible in earthly human existence. 
                                               
1
 Steven Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, Utopias of the Pali imaginaire (Cambridge Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 6-7. 
2
 Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, 1. 
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 A second flaw in Collins’s argument (albeit a less important one) is that Collins, I argue, 
implies that elite belief in supplementary post-mortem worlds was weak.3 Based upon my previous 
study of Christian elite belief in felicities, I argue that Collins perhaps over-simplified the 
complexities of elite beliefs. In this thesis, I will examine texts and other ancient narratives in 
order to argue that the Pali Buddhist and Christian elite maintained belief in both felicities and 
infelicities.  
 In this thesis, I will discuss characteristics of Buddhist infelicities, in order to provide an 
insight into the rich and complex worlds of Buddhist infelicities, while expanding and improving 
upon Collins’s hypothesis. In addition, I will take up Collins’s hint that his structure of felicities 
applies to other, non-Buddhist Agrarian societies. I hope that my twofold expansion of Collins’s 
argument to encompass infelicities, and non-Buddhist cases will create a more general and 
applicable structure of felicities and infelicities, with broader use in Religious Studies as a whole.  
 My study will be structured as follows.  
First, I will begin with an overall assessment and summary of Collins’s argument. I will 
provide a detailed summary of his definitions, his minor and major arguments, and the weaknesses 
I detect in those arguments. This summary section will also include a short summary of my 
previous thesis ‘Imagining Heaven in Agraria’, which will pave the way for my critique and 
subsequent argument for correctives and supplements to Collins’s theory.  
 I will then begin my argument for the inclusion of infelicities into the schema of imaginary 
supplementary worlds found throughout Agaria. I will first describe the infelicities of the Buddhist 
imaginaire. Here, I will define and discuss three infelicitous post-mortem fates in all. However, the 
primary focus of my study of Buddhist infelicities will be the Buddhist hells. I have chosen to 
                                               
3
 Ibid.,6. 
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focus on the hells because they constitute the most significant part of the Buddhist imaginaire, 
although that is not to say other infelicitous states are not important. Buddhist hells also serve as a 
useful point of comparison to Latinate Christianity, thus preparing us for the comparative section 
of my study. My aim in providing detailed descriptions of the infelicities in the Buddhist 
imaginaire is to suggest that the complex world of infelicities may have constituted a larger part of 
the Buddhist imaginaire than the felicities.  
 In the second section of this thesis, I will provide a contrast to the Buddhist imaginaire by 
outlining infelicities in the Latinate Christian imaginaire. This imaginaire is limited to pre-
Reformation Christianity, and will serve my larger argument as an instance of another Agrarian 
society in which infelicities arguably also constituted a large part of the imaginaire. Due to the 
historical context surrounding Christianity and its descent from Judaism, this section will include 
references to early Judaic imaginings of the underworld that later informed Christian visions. As 
stated above, Collins envisages his hypothesis to apply to multiple Agrarian societies. In the 
comparative component of this thesis, I hope to sketch a typology that will be potentially broad 
enough to encompass all infelicities found in Agrarian societies. 
 I will conclude my study with a more general discussion of the ways we think about 
infelicitous post-mortem fates, and how both Buddhist and Christian societies have structured 
such worlds. A large part of this final section will consider how infelicities contribute to 
maintaining stability through violent means, and what could be broadly described ‘scare tactics’. 
This discussion will thus expose another significant flaw in Collins’s argument, which is that in 
only discussing felicities, he presents felicities as the only factor motivating the maintenance of 
social order. I argue that when we include infelicities into the schema of imaginary supplementary 
worlds, we see that the social order in Agrarian systems of government was in fact more complex 
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than Collins proposes. In this section, I hope to explore how cosmology affects this world social 
order, showing that while other worlds seem separate from our world, in Agrarian societies they 
had great affect not only on the governing systems of that particular society, but on the realities of 
daily life. 
 
 
 
Summary of Collins’s argument and key terms 
 
  For the purposes of this thesis, I will define ‘Agraria’ as it is described by Steven Collins in 
‘Nirvana...’ The Agrarian period is characterised by the transition of traditionally nomadic hunter-
gatherer groups towards settled agricultural societies.4 This transition required a coordinated and 
cooperative effort, as food and other resources such as land were claimed by particular groups, as 
opposed to previous conditions in which land was occupied periodically by various nomadic 
groups.5 ‘Ownership’ brought about conditions such as poverty and servitude, and arguably, this 
can be considered as a type of feudalism, broadly defined, which is found throughout the Agrarian 
period.6  
The advent of Agraria resulted in the restructuring of society into larger groups outside of 
the immediate and extended family traditions of nomadic culture.7 This restructuring resulted in 
disparity and disadvantaged many, while elevating a minority to elite status. Agraria re-organized 
society into increasingly large-scale groupings, i.e., ‘Big Men’ systems or chiefdoms, which 
                                               
4
 Ibid.,5. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid. 
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operated under kingdoms, which operated in turn under empires, as regional and transregional 
regimes spread throughout India, Sri Lanka and across to South East Asia.8 Large expansive 
territories were governed by ‘Big Men’, and such territories, and various smaller chiefdoms, 
extended outward from the central main polity of the ‘Wheel-turning King’ or Emperor (such 
rulers are referred to as cakkavattis).9 Agrarian societies and their governing bodies can be 
characterised by power oscillating between a strong central power base and a weaker external 
power base.10  
Agraria was dynamic and ever-changing, containing sprawling urban centres, villages and 
the countryside, while encompassing civilians of all backgrounds under a central ruling power. In 
order for such large polities to function, some form of governing body was required. Collins argues 
that stability was maintained by ‘some mixture of routinized and bureaucratized military and/or 
political power’.11 The political power base of the Agrarian state tended to dominate the region 
through violent means, taxation and the right to draft labour and form militia.12 Through these 
means, the elite were able to enforce the law—arguably, laws which were most beneficial to the 
elite—and ensure that their rule continued. Collins argues that an ideology is often employed by 
the elite which ‘justifies’ or ‘legitimizes’ the social status quo (though he concedes that this point 
is debatable).13 The elite class extract resources and goods from those referred to as the non-elite, 
who offered up such resources as tribute to the elite and the state. Another term for this particular 
governing system is ‘tributary state’.14 This term is used in reference to the divide between the 
tribute-givers and the tribute-takers, and at times, it also refers to subsidiary states of a particular 
                                               
8
 Ibid.,5. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid.,6.  
13
 Ibid.  
14
 Ibid.  
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empire, who offer up resources in order to maintain peace.  
The notion of the ‘Agrarian' is particularly key in this study, as this is the period in which 
humanity arguably entered civilization. Collins argues that it is during this period that complex 
imaginaires were created and transmitted across cultures. Agraria is not confined to a specific time 
frame, in the sense that it cannot be set by dates. Collins argues that imaginaires remained 
conceptually static throughout the Agrarian period. However, I will argue that over time and across 
different cultures, imaginaires did in fact evolve, and became increasingly more complex and 
detailed. 
 
Collins employs another unusual but useful term, which I have already mentioned, the 
concept of the imaginaire. Jacques Le Goff provides the initial foundation for Collins’s use of the 
term imaginaire. His definition is this:  
 
Where it has a slightly more precise sense of a non-material, imaginative world, constituted 
by texts, especially works of art and literature...such worlds are by definition not the same 
as the material world, but in so far as the material is thought and experienced in part 
through them, they are imaginary in the sense of being false, entirely made up.15  
 
Hubert and Mauss provide a further argument for the concept of the imaginaire in their 
statement: ‘Religious ideas exist, because they are believed; they exist objectively, as social facts.’16 
An imaginaire is a sphere that operates within a civilization, which is constituted by texts and 
other forms of media, such as architecture and art, that communicate ideas or concepts to the 
                                               
15
 Ibid., 73.  
16
 Steven Collins, Nirvana: Concept, Imagery, Narrative. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 4. 
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citizens of the state.17 Imaginaires are constructed, maintained and instantiated by the ruling elite, 
which is composed of two sub-groups: the political elite, made up of kings, emperors and chiefs; 
and the religious elite, i.e., priests and the wider monastic community.18 Collins argues that it is ‘a 
plausible hypothesis to suggest that [the imaginaire] provided a ‘discursive arena for ruling elites 
to both propagate the Grand Narratives of society and soteriology which articulated their power, 
and to exclude others from that arena...’.19 Imaginaires and the space they created allowed for a 
limited power base that was exclusive of a large percentage of the populace, but also provided an 
arena in which both types of elites were able to criticise one another.  
Imaginaires emerged amid the Agrarian elite and filtered downwards and outwards to the 
non-elite classes. ‘Nirvana...’ refers only to the Pali Buddhist imaginaire, ‘a discursive textual world 
available to the imagination of elites, and gradually others, in the pre-modern Agrarian societies of 
Southern Asia.’20 Collins argues that the discourse of felicity, along with Pali Buddhist ideology in 
the general sense ‘helped justify the extraction of tribute by ruling elites’.21  
 In this thesis, I will follow Collins’s definitions of the terms, as well Collins’s general 
argument that felicities served the ruling elite to maintain social order. However, I will go beyond 
Collins in applying this argument to infelicities, and to both the Buddhist and Christian 
imaginaires. As I have stated, I intend to challenge Collins’s argument, but I mean to do only in 
the sense that it does not include infelicities and is therefore incomplete.  
Above I have outlined the key terms and concepts required for this thesis along with a 
summary of Steven Collins’s argument. This has provided the basis for my study and the 
extension of Collins’s proposed theory of felicity. I now turn to the second part of my thesis in 
                                               
17
 Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, 18. 
18
 Collins, Nirvana: Concept, Imagery, Narrative, 5. 
19
 Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, 16. 
20
 Ibid., 18. 
21
 Ibid., 19. 
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which I will survey a series of infelicitous rebirth destinies found in the Buddhist imaginaire which 
will provide evidence for my claim that infelicities were a part of the Buddhist imaginaire.  
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Part I 
Buddhist Infelicities 
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Introduction: Some doctrinal background to the Buddhist infelicities 
 
  The first Chapter of this thesis will focus on infelicities of the Buddhist imaginaire. In 
order to discuss these Buddhist infelicities, it is necessary to have an understanding of how karma 
(kamma), rebirth and puñña (sometimes known in English as ‘merit’) work in the Buddhist mind, 
as these three concepts affect one’s rebirth and whether they experience a felicitous or infelicitous 
rebirth. The first section of this Chapter will define and discuss how each concept is vital to 
understanding the Buddhist infelicity structure. Following this section, I will discuss each 
infelicitous fate in detail, describing the state in which one exists, how one comes to be reborn in 
such a state, focusing on the types of sin and behaviours that lead to rebirth as an animal, peta or 
in hell. I will also discuss how each infelicity has developed over time and culture, as arguably, 
there is variance across the geographical region that I have surveyed. This Chapter on Buddhist 
infelicities intends to demonstrate that infelicities inhabit a very large, complex and detailed world 
that must be considered when discussing the Buddhist imaginaire. The spread of infelicities and 
their constant presence in Buddhist doctrine amongst the multiple Buddhist traditions is another 
marker of their importance in the overall imaginaire. I will discuss each rebirth fate in hierarchical 
order from least terrifying fate to the absolute worst possible rebirth. This set of descriptions will 
provide the basis for my later discussion of infelicities, and the impact they have on governing 
systems in Agaria. 
 
  As I stated above, infelicities are the opposite of felicities, in that infelicity is a general 
term that denotes any and all forms of unhappiness, ill-health or suffering. Buddhist cosmology 
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envisions that each being experiences an infinite number of rebirths and redeaths. As a result 
multiple infelicities exist in the Buddhist imaginaire. Infelicities in the Buddhist imaginaire are all 
unfortunate or even ‘evil’ rebirth destinies. The three evil rebirth destinies found in the Buddhist 
imaginaire are rebirth as an animal—or, more aptly, ‘beast’; rebirth as a peta—sometimes referred 
to as a hungry ghost; or rebirth in hell as a hell-being.22 There is some debate as to whether a 
fourth rebirth fate known as an asura exists; this is a demon or titan-like being. Due to the 
contestability of this destiny, I will not discuss this rebirth in my study of Buddhist infelicities.  
Rebirth, kamma and puñña, are all terms and concepts that are important to define in the 
study of felicitous and infelicitous post-mortem experiences in the Buddhist imaginaire. I will 
provide definitions for each in turn.  
  
Rebirth 
Wendy O’Flaherty claims the ‘theory of rebirth is based on the moral quality of previous 
lives’.23  The theory of rebirth affirms that life is cyclical and constant, death followed by (re)-birth, 
repeated until nirvana is attained. Nirvana thus can be understood as ‘the transcendence of both 
life and death’.24 All beings in the Buddhist cosmos are subject to samsara--transmigration between 
life and death through one of the five or six rebirth destinies. The five or six destinies and realms 
are: hell-being, peta, animal, asura (titan, warring gods), human or deva (heavenly gods).25 Rebirth 
is complicated by the addition of kamma, which can be considered a moralising system. I now turn 
to the description of that concept.  
                                               
22
 Richard F. Gombrich, How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2006), 83. 
23
 Wendy Doniger O’Flaherty, Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition, Berkley, California: University of 
California Press, 1980), xi. 
24
 Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, xi. 
25
 Collins, Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities, 299. 
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Karma 
Kamma is best understood as actions that affect potentials in the inner unconscious life 
which manifest in future results.26 Actions that create kamma are physical, verbal or mental; one’s 
thoughts and speech can directly impact one’s kamma.27 Kamma operates on a law of causality, in 
which actions from one’s past affect one’s present, and actions in one’s present affect one’s 
future.28 Kamma then affects one’s birth and individual status in life, as defined by one’s previous 
actions. This is in opposition to society determining one’s social status, such as the caste system of 
Vedaism, the other prevalent belief system present at the advent of Buddhism. Kamma can be 
divided into two types, fixed and unfixed. Fixed kamma is that which is effectual in the present, in 
contrast unfixed kamma may present results at any time, in the present or in future rebirths. 
Below are two descriptions of kamma by A. K Ramaniya and Charles Keyes 
 
A. K Ramaniya  
 
1. Causality (ethical or non-ethical in relation to previous lives) 
2. Ethicization (belief that good or bad acts result in actions in this life or future life) 
3. Rebirth.29 
 
Charles Keyes 
                                               
26
 Doniger O’Flaherty, Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition, xix. 
27
 Ibid. xi. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Doniger O’Flaherty, Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Tradition, xi. 
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1. Explanation of present circumstances with reference to previous actions. (inclusive of 
actions prior to birth) 
 2. Orientation of present actions towards future ends. 
 3. Moral basis on which actions both past and present is predicated.30 
 
 The above listings or descriptions of kamma demonstrate how kamma has been ethicized 
and that all kamma relates to all actions, be they moral or immoral. By ethicizing kamma, rebirth 
provides an explanation of the personal circumstances of each individual, while placing the blame 
firmly on the individual for their circumstances. This then orientates future behaviour towards that 
which is considered socially acceptable thus preventing socially corrosive behaviour and 
maintaining stability.  
 
Puñña 
In addition to kamma, special types of action are able to generate puñña or merit.31 Tommi 
Lehoten claims that puñña is part of a moral or ‘social system which uses sanctions for enforcing 
and reinforcing social discipline and conformity’.32 Puñña is received when one partakes in actions 
that are ‘in accordance with social standards’, or specific religious acts or rituals.33 In particular, 
giving to the sangha, the Buddhist monastic order, or engaging in particular ritual, meditation 
and/or prayers, are actions that are able to generate puñña. At this point I will not expand as to 
                                               
30
 Ibid., xix. 
31
 Tommi Lehtonen, “The Notion of Merit in Indian Religions,” Asian Philosophy 10 (2000): 189. 
32
Lehtonen, “The Notion of Merit in Indian Religions,” 190. 
33
 Ibid. 
19 
how this affects the structure of Agrarian society. In my discussion of peta, I will argue that puñña 
and gift giving constitutes a significant part of stabilising society. In exchange, the participant 
receives puñña, and puñña, like kamma is non-transferable.34 Puñña is the reward received by 
those who adhere to ‘prescribed behaviour’ thus puñña alongside kamma can be considered a 
moralising system employed by the elite to maintain political power and social stability. 
 
As I have described, all infelicities in the Buddhist imaginaire are rebirth destinies which 
are determined by an individual’s kamma and puñña. Understanding kamma, rebirth and puñña 
are key to thinking about Buddhist infelicities as it is these three concepts that influence an 
individual’s rebirth fate. In discussing rebirth, kamma and puñña I hope to have also provided 
some insight into the type of society that the Buddhist imaginaire existed in. This is especially 
relevant in thinking about how the elite manipulated religious concepts for their gain and for the 
maintenance of society. Arguably, the ethicization of kamma and the introduction of puñña that 
encouraged gift giving provided material gain to the elite allowed for them to promote certain 
behaviours and abhor others that may be considered socially corrosive.  
 
  
                                               
34
 Ibid., 189. 
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Chapter 1: Animals in Buddhism 
 
Rebirth as an animal 
 
  Rebirth as an animal is arguably the least terrifying prospect of the three infelicitous 
rebirths, but also the most challenging destiny to the Western thinker, due to our own perceptions 
of animals. It must also be stated that researching this section proved to be challenging, as very 
little research concerning rebirth as an animal has been conducted in the study of Buddhism. I will 
begin this section by discussing the Buddhist perspective on animals, as there are varying 
perspectives on the status of animals in Buddhism. Following this introduction to Buddhist 
thought on animals, I will discuss the realm that animals exist in known as tiracchānayoni. The 
final point of this chapter on rebirth as an animal will be a section on the types of suffering one 
may experience as an animal. Part of this final section will consider the types of behaviour that 
lead to rebirth as an animal.  
 
Buddhist perspectives on animals and rebirth as an animal 
 
In order to understand why rebirth as animal is infelicitous an understanding of Buddhist 
perspectives on animals is required. Lambert Schmithausen is one the few academics to write 
extensively on the subject of animals in Buddhism. Schmithausen categorizes Buddhist 
perspectives regarding animals into two categories, the ‘doctrinal perspective’ and the ‘popular’ or 
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hermitage perspective.35 Throughout this chapter I will refer to the second perspective as the 
‘popular’ perspective, which will include what Schmithausen refers to as the ‘hermitage’ 
perspective, as I claim that there is significant crossover between the two perspectives. The 
doctrinal perspective refers to dogmatic views of animals, in contrast to the popular perspective 
which refer to Buddhist folk and hermitage tales in which animals interact with monastic or other 
spiritual leaders.36 Buddhism preaches compassion for all sentient beings, and for those who are 
not well acquainted with Buddhism, it may appear that Buddhism is a religion in which animals 
are considered equal to man. Shakyamuni Buddha’s teachings express compassion towards animals 
and wholeheartedly express that animals should not be harmed for the benefit of humankind. 
However, in this chapter, the conversation regarding animals will express Buddhist perspectives 
that do not reflect the above belief that Buddhists believe animals to be equal to man. The two 
perspectives I will present are not in any way the full range of Buddhist beliefs concerning 
animals. The compassion that Buddhists showed towards animals, as well as the later development 
of vegetarianism, initially distinguished Buddhism from other Indic religions of its time. Arguably, 
as the Buddhist cosmological structure expanded and grew, Buddhist attitudes towards animals 
became more complex.37 
The doctrinal perspective, Schmithausen argues, is more normative than the opposing 
popular perspective.38 The doctrinal perspective is primarily based upon Buddhist scripture, and 
adheres to strict Buddhist cosmological doctrine that animals are lesser beings and therefore 
rebirth as an animal is infelicitous.39 Animals are considered lesser beings than humans because 
                                               
35
 Lambert Schmithausen, “Attitudes towards Animals in Indian Buddhism,” in Penser, dire et représenter l'animal 
dans le monde Indien, ed. Nalini Balbir and G. J. Pinault (Paris: Champion, 2009), 4. 
36
 Ibid., 106-107. 
37
 Ibid., 50. 
38
 Ibid., 85. 
39
 Ibid. 
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they behave in a manner that is considered unethical and immoral.40 It should be noted, however, 
that Buddhist doctrine, in stating that animals do not behave in a moral and ethical manner, base 
morality and ethics which the Buddhist order prescribes for humans. Because of this, those reborn 
in the animal realm are unlikely to encounter a human rebirth immediately after their birth in the 
animal realm. This is due to the fact that they will likely accumulate significant quantities of 
undesirable kamma and will be unable to generate any puñña that may potentially affect and 
improve their next rebirth. This primarily negative view of animals can be extended to an ideal in 
which, for the most devout Buddhists, a world without animals would be considered a type of 
utopia.41 A world without animals is considered a type of utopia, as the absence of animals would 
present a world in which all sentient beings are at a stage of enlightenment in which they only 
exist in a human or deva state. 
 The popular perspective is in opposition to the doctrinal perspective. This perspective 
presents a more positive attitude towards animals and rebirth as an animal. Schmithausen states 
this perspective is primarily based upon what can be categorized as folk Buddhism.42 This 
perspective originates in the folk religious traditions that existed prior to the advent and arrival of 
Buddhism. As a result, we cannot be certain what is ‘original’ Buddhism and what is a cultural bi-
product specific to that region and time prior to Buddhism. The popular perspective utilises folk 
and fairy tales that tend to have similar perspectives, or are similar to the morality-based tales 
known as the jātaka’s that often feature heroic animals.43 Schmithausen notes that it is likely that 
many of the jātakasa tales were not part of early Buddhist literature, and it is reasonable to think 
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that they are tales that have been adapted for Buddhism.44 As a result, perhaps the popular or 
hermitage perspective is not a Buddhist perspective, but rather, a cultural perspective.   
  Narratives such as the jātakas tend to anthropomorphise animals, emphasizing that they 
can be moral beings.45 This literature tends to illustrate types of specific ritual behaviours that one 
should aspire to, even as an animal. Literature of this kind was popular entertainment for laity and 
was utilised by the monastic order as preaching material. Another set of tales that are part of the 
popular perspective, are stories Schmithausen refers to as hermitage tales. These tales emphasize 
that, when in the presence of an advanced spiritual being i.e., bodhisattvas or arhats animals are 
able to behave in a moral manner.46 In the presence of a spiritual teacher, animals are able to deny 
their natural instincts as evidenced by the tale of tigers refusing to kill other animals following an 
encounter with a spiritual figure.47 This above tale states that with the influence and moral 
guidance of a spiritual leader, the tigers spend the rest of their lives subsisting on grass.48 Other 
animals featured in hermitage stories are those that tend to have a discordant relationship with 
one another, such as mongooses and snakes. However, in the presence of a spiritual being, these 
animals will are able to co-exist in harmony.49 
The two narratives I have discussed above provide a positive perspective on the nature of 
‘beasts’ or animals. However, this cannot be considered a true positive perspective on animals. I 
claim this, as it is frequently noted that the ‘special’ animals of these tales are the reincarnations of 
particularly enlightened sentient beings.50 Positive perspectives on animals in Buddhism can be 
considered a result of certain traditions with doctrines that emphasize Buddha-nature, and that 
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Buddha-nature can be awoken in animals.51 Particular Buddhist traditions may have stronger 
positive perspectives on animals than others due to doctrinal beliefs, such as the concept of 
Buddha-nature, which is prevalent in only some Buddhist traditions. 
Given that the popular literature is not entirely Buddhist in ‘origin’, it is not limited by 
Buddhist dogma located in complex cosmology. The result of this is it is able to portray animals 
and rebirth as an animal in a more positive light. However, even though popular literature is not 
entirely Buddhist, it was arguably influential in emphasizing that all sentient beings are victims of 
their own kamma. Negative literature about animals provided a disincentive for undesirable 
behaviour, while popular tales provided stories in which the anthropomorphizations of animals 
express compassion for befallen relatives, and for other sentient beings, who at some point in the 
cycle of samsara would have been a family member.  
 
Tiracchānayoni and the realm of beasts 
 
  Tiracchānayoni is the realm of beasts, while it seems somewhat illogical or strange that 
animals inhabit a realm outside of jambudvīpa, our realm and world, I will try to express how 
tiracchānayoni operates both separately and as part of this realm. Animals in our world appear in 
all forms, and all species we encounter are part of tiracchānayoni, whether they are wild or 
domesticated or even on our tables as meals. However, tiracchānayoni when depicted in Buddhist 
imagery appears very different from the animal kingdom experienced in jambudvīpa. Images of 
tiracchānayoni often feature illustrations of ‘beasts’ and hybrids of animals and humans; most 
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often the body is animal, with the head human or vice versa.52 Images like those I have described 
above appear in a set of images known as the Kumano Mind Maṇḍala, a maṇḍala utilised by the 
Japanese monastic community as a preaching tool during the 15th-17th centuries.53 Hybrid 
creatures of this kind are not limited to tiracchānayoni as a realm present in our physical world, as 
animals are present in the Buddhist heavens and hells.54 
 The presence of animals in heaven and hell is useful in the study of Buddhist perspectives 
on animals and understanding what I perceive to be a hierarchy of animals in Buddhism. The 
presence of animals in Buddhist heavens has been a topic of debate amongst the various Buddhist 
schools, as particular traditions envision a world without animals as a type of utopia. Animals can 
be found in certain heavens, and other realms such as the land of Uttakuru. However, an example 
of this debate is the Sabbatthivāda school claims that animals do not exist in heaven or any other 
sacred or holy land.55. Animals found in heaven tend to be anthropomorphized and therefore 
embody specific human traits or characteristics which elevate their status.56 Elephants, horses and 
birds, other beatific and noble animals are the type of animals found in the Buddhist heavens.57 
Creatures that are considered repulsive, such as maggots, snakes, moths, other reptiles and 
invertebrates are not permitted in heaven.58 In the many Buddhist hells, ‘hybrid’ beasts exist; these 
tend to be imagined or mythical creatures Animals found in hell are species which are considered 
lesser on jambudvīpa, such as dogs, crows and maggots.59 These animals are made all the more 
terrifying and repulsive in hell by the addition of unusual and terrifying features such as the dogs 
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being rabid, the crows given iron beaks with which they torture sinners and the maggots having 
minute teeth to consume sinners’ bodies.60 Such abominations add to the already frightening 
nature of Buddhist hells, and arguably cement the status of particular animals as lesser, while 
animals found in heaven are considered worthy of the presence of humans and devas. 
 Animals inhabit many realms in the Buddhist cosmos, be it here on jambudvīpa and the 
overlapping realm of Tiracchayanoni, or in Uttakuru. It is has been debated whether animals 
physically exist in the Buddhist heavens and hells. This debate further supports my claim that the 
Buddhist imaginaire is primarily concerned with eudemonia and how other existences in the 
cosmos relate to humankind, as opposed to the experiences of all sentient beings 
 
 Understanding the types of suffering in Tiracchānayoni 
 
 It may be difficult to understand what exactly is so sufferable about rebirth as an 
animal. In this section I will discuss the sufferings of those reborn as animals. Understanding the 
suffering conditions of an animal is particularly difficult in our present Western world, as a 
prevalent pop-culture opinion suggests that rebirth as an animal is pleasant compared to human 
suffering. 
  Buddhists view those reborn as animals as foolish, although to some extent Buddhists 
empathize with the plight of those who are reborn as animals. However, given my above 
discussion of Buddhist perspectives on animals, it should be clear that Buddhists are not entirely 
sympathetic towards animals, and animals are considered lesser beings.61 Following my discussion 
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on suffering as an animal, I will describe the actions that result in rebirth as an animal. 
  Before my case study on the Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds maṇḍala, I will 
introduce some customary reasons as to why one is reborn as an animal. The primary reason for 
rebirth as an animal are types of undesirable behaviour, or personality traits that are associated 
with animals.62 Particular animals serve as representatives for certain sins or unsavoury personality 
traits, like greed, envy or anger.63 An example of this is those who express ill will or hatred towards 
others are often reborn as snakes.64 Another reason for rebirth as an animal is violence towards 
animals, as a result the sinner is reborn as the animal they mistreated, and made to suffer the 
same treatment.65 Buddhist literature frequently claims that farmers abuse or overwork their oxen, 
even when urged by passing monks to treat their working animals with compassion. It is these 
men who are destined to suffer the fate of their oxen in a future life. The most unusual and 
seemingly illogical reason given for rebirth as an animal is the sin of seduction of the monastic 
order.66 Sentient beings who attempt seduce anyone in the monastic order, it is claimed, will be 
reborn as an ‘ignorant horse’ or ‘stupid ox’.67 
 The Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds Maṇḍala is a particular case study I am 
using as an example of animals in the Buddhist imaginaire. The Kumano Mind Contemplation 
Ten Worlds maṇḍala is a significant piece of evidence in my study of rebirth as an animal, as it is 
a very complex and richly detailed Japanese Buddhist artefact. The particular sin that emerges in 
The Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds maṇḍala for rebirth as an animal is the sin of too 
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much attachment to family members.68 Unrelenting emotional attachment to one’s parents or 
children is a reason given for rebirth as an animal.69 This, I argue, is very unusual in the case of 
Japanese Buddhism, which it has been argued has a stronger tendency for filial piety than other 
types of Buddhism.70 The Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten Worlds Maṇḍala presents an example 
in which the Buddhist imaginaire and types of behaviour ascribed as desirable and undesirable 
undergo transformation over culture and time. In this section, I have considered a variety of 
Buddhist literature and secondary sources on the subject of rebirth as an animal, and the 
particular actions or behaviours that result in rebirth as an animal, here I will discuss the sort of 
suffering one encounters when reborn as an animal. As stated, comparatively, being reborn as an 
animal is a much less infelicitous rebirth destiny than rebirth as a peta or in one of the Buddhist 
hells. However, rebirth as an animal is considered infelicitous for the following reasons. The major 
reason as to why being reborn as an animal is infelicitous, is because as an animal once is unable 
to be enlightened. It is also very unlikely that as an animal, a being would be able to receive the 
dhamma, and even if they did, they would likely be powerless to create a better rebirth fate by 
generating puñña. As for actual suffering, being reborn as an animal is infelicitous, as it is claimed 
that animals live in constant fear, because they are hunted by other animals or man. Animals are 
likely to live short lives because they are often prey, if they are not hunted due to being 
domesticated, they will likely suffer mistreatment at the hands of their human masters. Rebirth as 
an animal is not one of the worst rebirth destinies in the Buddhist imaginaire. However, it is 
infelicitous because one experiences suffering and is unable to be enlightened in this form. 
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Conclusion 
 
As I stated at the beginning of this chapter, there is a very little academic literature on the 
subject of animals, and given my own language limitations, I am unable to determine how 
prevalent literature on the topic of animals was in the Buddhist canon. However, given the subject 
material I was able to collect for this Chapter, rebirth as an animal was arguably an infelicitous 
fate that constituted part of the Buddhist imaginaire. In understanding how infelicities constituted 
part of the imaginaire it is particularly important to look at how felicities were utilised by the 
monastic community and by the governing body to maintain order. The Kumano Mind 
Contemplation Ten Worlds Maṇḍala provides an example as to how rebirth as an animal was 
utilised by the monastic order to spread the imaginaire. The Kumano Mind Contemplation Ten 
Worlds Maṇḍala further provided incentives and disincentives for certain behaviour types, and 
thereby was utilised by the elite in maintaining the social order. The itinerant monastic order used 
the images of the maṇḍala as well as performances to the word of the Buddha while serving the 
interests of the ruling elite. The fear this imagery instilled in the lay audiences was arguably 
enough to encourage behaviour that was considered socially acceptable while providing an apt 
disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour.  
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Chapter 2: Petas 
 
Rebirth as a peta 
 
  Rebirth as an animal presents a challenge to a Western audience. However, even more 
unusual is rebirth as a peta. Peta are a type of creature which can be described as semi-human 
and ghost-like. There is substantial academic research on peta and their various incarnations 
throughout Asia, partially I believe because they are so unusual and as a result have fascinated the 
West. I will begin this section by describing peta and how peta vary across Asia, as a result 
defining peta can be challenging especially given within some texts peta appear in different forms. 
Peta have their own realm known as the peta-loka, which I will consider briefly when discussing 
what I consider to be a history of peta. Peta have a diverse history as they are a Vedic product 
which has been transformed by Buddhism, and the following history will also consider how peta 
have developed over the course of Buddhist history. As the primary purpose of this chapter to 
illustrate that infelicities were a significant part of the Buddhist imaginaire, a section of this 
chapter will consider the literature and other Buddhist artefacts that feature peta. The final section 
of my study of peta will be a section titled ‘The Function of Peta’. Steven Collins claims that 
felicities were used as motivation for adhering to socially acceptable behaviour in ‘The Function of 
Peta’ I will argue that peta served a similar function and show how peta in relation to puñña were 
utilised to maintain stability in Buddhist Agrarian society. My Chapter on peta will further 
illustrate another Buddhist infelicity and further my claim that infelicities were a significant part of 
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the Buddhist imaginaire. 
What is a peta? 
 Of the three evil rebirths, rebirth as a peta or peta, a ghost like being, is perhaps the most 
unusual and fascinating rebirth fate to the non-Buddhist. Peta literally translates as ‘departed one’, 
though it tends to refer to the ‘unhappy’.71 Pitr or peta as they are known in the Buddhist world 
are more commonly known in Western academic literature as ‘hungry ghosts’. Another term for 
peta is ‘hungry ghost’, this term is based off the translation of the Chinese word for peta, egui 餓
鬼.72 
 The earliest description of peta is found in Henri-Léon Feer’s 1884 article ‘Etudes 
Bouddhiques: comment on devient preta’. Feer claims that petas are creatures who are described 
as ‘having a mouth like a needle’, a distended stomach or belly the size of a mountain, they appear 
to be covered in long hair that covers their bodies like clothing, are on fire, and smell putrid.73 
Petas are often described as skeletal, though they typically have a distended stomach, perhaps 
suggesting their malnourished state.74 Feer states that petas are so tormented by their hunger and 
thirst that they constantly cry ‘I’m hungry, my friends, I’m thirsty, my friends’.75 Petas are unable 
to eat or drink due to their mouths being like a needle, those that do attempt to consume any food 
or water must watch this food burst into flames or turn into bodily fluids such as blood or pus.76  
  Preta retain their gender from their previous life, with female petas known as preti.77 
Women who are reborn as preti are worse off than their male counterparts and unlikely to 
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encounter a human rebirth in the near future. Preti who are reborn as women again, it is claimed, 
will suffer as ugly women, who must beg in the streets, and are beaten and ridiculed by all.78 A 
peculiar characteristic of peta is they are able to recall the misdeeds that led to their present 
state.79 I will discuss this unusual characteristic in my section which considers narratives and 
depictions of peta in Buddhist literature.  
  The above description is a typical description of a peta which is repeated throughout 
scholarly work, including Robert DeCaroli’s Haunting The Buddha, Jeffrey Shirkey’s ‘The Moral 
Economy of the Petavatthu: Hungry Ghosts and Theravada Buddhist Cosmology,’ as well as 
Stephen Teiser’s articles on hungry ghosts.  
 However, petas do not always conform to the above description. The Petavatthu, an early 
Buddhist text, concerning peta and its later 6th C.E. commentary, provides evidence of petas 
proving to be much more complex than the above standard typology.80 In this text, petas often do 
not share any similarities to the above description, and at times are not even referred to as petas 
and are at times mistaken for other non-human beings’, including devas.81 DeCaroli argues that, in 
defining peta, we should not rely on physical descriptions, but rather, distinguish between peta 
and other non-human beings based upon the emotional state of the being.82 
   Despite DeCaroli’s method offering a better indicator as to whether a being is a peta, 
there are certain types of peta that could be described as ‘bipolar’ or ‘schizoid’ petas who inhabit 
varying emotional states. These types of peta cannot be identified using DeCaroli’s method. In 
stating that types of peta are ‘bipolar’, I refer to the cyclic states and very disparate experiences 
these particular petas experience both extreme pleasure and tortuous suffering, in a sense they are 
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manic. ‘Bipolar’ petas, even in peta form experience happiness and pleasure periodically experience 
as well as immense unhappiness and suffering. This is the result of a combination of good and 
bad deeds. An example is the story of a hunter made a vow to a monk that he would no longer 
hunt at night. Because the hunter did not intentionally kill animals at night he is ‘rewarded’ with 
pleasures such as a beautiful mansion and female consorts.83 Come day, the hunter suffers and is 
distinctly unhappy, as he is punished for harming and killing animals during the day.84 Peta are 
unable to experience lasting pleasure and any pleasure they experience is fleeting or quickly 
replaced by suffering. 
 
The realm of peta (petaloka) 
 
The petaloka is the realm of the departed. It is said to be located five hundred yojanas 
below our world, Jambudvīpa, and just above niraya [hells].85 While the petaloka is a realm in 
itself, petas are not restricted to this realm. Most Buddhist knowledge concerning peta is based on 
the travels of monastic order to the peta-loka or encounters between petas and the laity. Tales of 
monks visiting the petaloka are usually tales which are told to the laity to demonstrate the spiritual 
power of the monastic order. The monastic’s who travel to the petaloka tend to be particularly 
spiritually advanced as an inordinately advanced state of meditation is often required to travel to 
other realms. Encounters between peta and the laity tend to take place in unusual circumstances, 
most often in places on the periphery of humanity, such as in the deep forest or in the dead of the 
night.  
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A history of peta, from pitṛ to egui 
 
As stated in my introduction, peta have a long and complex history that perhaps offers 
some clue as to the variance of descriptions of peta. In my brief definition of the term peta, I 
stated that peta refers to the departed and descends from the term pitṛ found in the Rg Veda and 
later Hindu texts.86 In the Vedic tradition it is inferred that pitṛ as a term is used only in reference 
to parents or ancestors of the previous three generations.87 Ian Kesarcodi-Watson claims that the 
petaloka, or the world of the departed, descends from the Vedic pitṛloka.88 Etymology alone 
suggests they are related. However, Kesarcodi-Watson claims that while we can understand the 
petaloka as descending from the pitṛloka, the two realms and beings that inhabit them are very 
different.89 First pitṛs as a being differs from petas in that they are not unhappy or suffering; 
rather, they are content and to an extent are superior to men.90Pitṛ are able to aid men, unlike 
petas, who are helpless in their own suffering, though Kesarcodi-Watson notes that pitṛ must not 
be confused with devas.91 Pitṛ are lesser beings than deva, as they have remaining kamma, 
therefore they suffer embodiment again.92 Although pitṛ are able to aid men, pitṛ also require 
appeasement and care from family members providing ‘appropriate offerings and oblations’, for 
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which they ‘hunger’.93 It is suggested in the Bhagavadgita that if pitṛs are not appeased pitṛs will 
fall into niraya, an early form of hell.94 
 As described above pitṛ cannot be considered the same as peta. The relation of petas to 
pitṛs may provide an explanation for the ‘bipolar’ petas who at times live like devas before 
returning to the unhappy and sufferable state of petas. 
  Despite the above standardised description, peta have undergone significant development 
from the pitṛ state. As Buddhism has transcended multiple cultures and spread throughout Asia, 
petas continue to undergo development. Throughout the Asian continent, many elaborate 
descriptions of peta exist. The limitations of this thesis do not allow me to discuss peta in all 
Buddhist traditions, let alone peta throughout the Buddhist world. However, I will make an 
example of Chinese peta to demonstrate how peta have changed over culture and time. 
 As I have mentioned above, peta are known as egui in Chinese. Egui have very particular 
and peculiar characteristics which are in contrast to my earlier descriptions of peta. The most 
unusual trait of Chinese peta is in images they are always presented as hanging upside down.95 It 
is likely that this trait is based on the popular tale of Mulian, which is the origin tale for the ritual 
known as yü-lan-p'en.96 Yü-lan-p'en is popularly understood to mean ‘the bowl (p’en) filled with 
offerings to save ancestors from hanging upside-down (Yü’lan) in purgatory’.97 The tale of Mulian 
is not unique to China; in India, Mulian is known as Maudgalyāyana. However, the popularity of 
the tale seems to have soared in China.  
Mulian was an accomplished monk who during meditation witnessed his mother suffering 
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in the peta-loka realm.98 Mulian attempted to ease his mother’s hunger by offering her a bowl of 
rice.99 Unfortunately Mulian’s mother was unable to eat the rice, as it turned into flames before 
she could consume it.100 Mulian asked [the] Buddha how he could help his mother, to which [the] 
Buddha replied ‘Your mother’s sins are grave; there is nothing that you as a single individual can 
do about it. You must rely on the mighty spiritual power of the assembled monks of the ten 
directions: for the sake of seven generations of ancestors and those in distress, you should gather 
[food] of the one hundred flavours and five kinds of fruit, place it in a bowl, and offer it to those 
of great virtue of the ten directions.’101 ‘[The] Buddha then decreed that an assembly of monks 
should chant prayers on behalf of seven generations of ancestors of the donor, that they should 
practice meditation and concentrate their thoughts and then receive the food.’102 With the aid of 
the monastic order, Mulian was able to release his mother from the petaloka realm.103  
  It has been argued that yü-lan-p'en as a ritual has origins in or can be linked with Chinese 
filial piety.104 Literary evidence suggests that yü-lan-p'en was popularised during the Tang dynasty, 
and became a significant ritual in the Chinese religious calendar. It has been argued the aspect of 
filial piety in Chinese interpretations of peta took on a new or greater meaning than it previously 
had in Buddhism.105 The rise of the ancestral cult, Teiser notes, was not unique to China ‘It shares 
many affinities with Korean ritual for lost souls, manghon-il’.106 Japan’s celebration of Obon is very 
similar to yü-lan-p'en, and it too has undergone significant changes since its transference from 
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China in the seventh century.107 Teiser and Shirkey both argue that one of the distinctive features 
of rituals like yü-lan-p'en or other rituals pertaining to peta is that they bring the deceased relative 
back into the world, albeit temporarily.108 This in turn propagates the connection between the 
living and the deceased, which may then increase offerings gifted to the sangha, this further 
connects  the monastic order and the community.109  
  In the view of some academics, yü-lan-p’en is a phenomenon unique to Chinese 
Buddhism, due to the prominence of filial piety and the ancestral cult prior to the arrival of 
Buddhism. The cult of the ancestor is not unique to East Asian Buddhism. Ancestral cults have 
roots in India; however, the form that ancestral cults took in China was different and unusual. Pre-
Buddhist ancestral cults tended to focus on filial piety towards the father, specifically sons caring 
for fathers in the afterlife.110 According to some studies, Buddhism filled the void for post-mortem 
care for mothers, with the tale of Mulian’s descent to the peta-loka to save his mother. As a result, 
this type of Buddhism holds the family semi-responsible for the fate and salvation of one’s 
ancestors.111 I claim that like many post-mortem rituals or acts of care for the dead, Yü-lan-p'en 
encourages Buddhist practitioners to express compassion for all beings, while recognizing the 
potential fates of their family members and their own potential rebirth.  
 
The presence of peta in the Buddhist world 
  
                                               
107
 Ibid. (Yu-lan-p’en is a festival in * Japan that takes place on the fifteenth day of the seventh lunar month (July-
August) in which offerings are made to the spirits of the deceased. The ceremony originated in * China around the 
6th century C.E. and over the centuries has absorbed elements of non-Buddhist beliefs and practices.) 
108
 Teiser, “Ghosts and Ancestors in Medieval Chinese Religions,” 56. 
109
 Shirkey, “Moral Economy.” 
110
 Wright, “Buddhism and Chinese Culture: Phases of Interaction”, 18. 
111
 Teiser, “Ghosts and Ancestors in Medieval Chinese Religions,” 
38 
  The Petavatthu or Stories of the Peta contains fifty-one individual stories of peta.112 The 
Petavatthu is similar to the Jātaka tales, as I argue its primary function is as a set of moralising 
tales. The Jātakasa tales describe actions committed by the Buddha that elevate him, and thus 
serves as a set of teaching tales as to how one should behave. In contrast, the Petavatthu tales 
describe immoral actions committed by those who have been reborn in the peta realm. The 
Petavatthu is primarily a teaching tool, providing the laity with the methods and knowledge 
required to prevent rebirth as a peta and how to aid those who have been reborn as a peta. Stories 
in the Petavatthu follow a structured narrative, which usually begins with a person encountering a 
peta. Often this encounter is on the outer rims of society and the person who encounters the peta 
is a relation or has some past connection to the peta. It is very common that the peta is a familial 
member of the person the peta seeks out. Occasionally monks or other spiritually elevated persons 
encounter peta. In all stories, the peta pleads for help from their family member or members, 
asking them to ease their suffering. Often the person who encountered the peta will seek out help 
from the monastic community. The main purpose of the monastic community is to identify the 
past sins of the peta that resulted in this infelicitous rebirth. The cause for rebirth as peta is 
always identified in the story, as this is necessary for the Petavatthu to act as a moralising 
ideological tool. Once the cause of the infelicitous rebirth has been established, a method of aiding 
the peta is prescribed, which usually involves a ritual like or similar to yü-lan-p'en, that involves 
making offerings to the sangha who in return perform rites to aid the suffering peta.  
 The Petavatthu serves as an ideological tool that was a source of both entertainment, in 
the drama it creates while being read aloud to the laity, and as a set of terrifying tales which acted 
as a disincentive for types of behaviour that was considered socially corrosive. The Petavatthu 
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provides incentives for other types of more desirable behaviours, specifically types of behaviour 
which benefit the sangha. Given that one of the primary aims of the Petavatthu is to provide 
preventative methods to avoid rebirth as a peta, it places particular emphasis on giving to the 
sangha in order to generate merit for petas.113 
 The Buddhist canon and folk literature are not the only artefacts in which images of peta 
can be found. Images of peta can be found in temples and other venues across Asia. Illustrations 
of peta tend to depict methods to help peta or the specifics of peta suffering. Sculptural depictions 
of peta, such as those found on the Borobudur temple in Indonesia, depict peta as skeletal beings 
praying to the Buddha for deliverance.114 Later Chinese and Japanese artistic depictions of peta 
tend to illustrate scenarios in which peta are aided, such as the ‘Hungry Ghosts Scroll’ found in 
the Kyoto National Museum.115 The ‘Hungry Ghosts Scroll’ illustrates a scene in which the peta 
come begging to their relatives for help, and their relatives, being devout and compassionate 
Buddhists act out the required rituals in order to aid and release the petas from their suffering. 
 In this brief section regarding evidence of peta, I have shown that peta make up a 
significant part of the Buddhist imaginaire concerning infelicities. The Petavatthu as one of the 
primary texts on peta is incredibly detailed in the fifty one tales it tells of peta and their 
misfortunes. The Petavatthu and other images of peta such as sculptures or paintings serve an 
ideological purpose, in that like pictorials depicting rebirth as an animal, such images frighten the 
audience into behaving in a way that is socially acceptable and does not pose a threat to the ruling 
elite and society as a whole.  
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The function of peta in the Pali Buddhist imaginaire 
 
 Jeffrey Shirkey argues that peta serve three purposes. As a result the Buddhist monastic 
community utilise peta to encourage ‘gift’ giving, while offering a set of preventative means to 
avoid rebirth as a peta, and consoling the grieving family of the recent dead.116 As peta are aided 
by family members, they at times can sometimes achieve a more felicitous rebirth with the merit, 
generated by their family. I believe that with the evidence I have presented, I have significant 
reason to claim that rebirth as a peta like rebirth as animal, constitutes a significant part of the 
Buddhist imaginaire.  
  Academic literature on peta is extensive, as the nature of peta is unusual and fascinating to 
both the Buddhist and the non-Buddhist. Peta are found throughout the Buddhist world, and exist 
in varying forms. Peta have changed over culture and time, and taken on new symbolism. My 
evidence of the varying rituals for peta or egui in China, Korea and Japan demonstrates the various 
roles and cultures that peta have inhabited. However, peta were already a prolific part of the Pali 
Buddhist imaginaire, arguably one of the earliest forms of the Buddhist imaginaire. The Petavatthu 
is a one example of the significance of peta in the Pali Buddhist imaginaire, as it is a text 
dedicated entirely to telling stories of peta, and describing peta. The Petavatthu serves as a 
moralising text, which is arguably an important part of maintaining stability through the 
imaginaire, by frightening the laity with a fate they may encounter if they do not adhere to socially 
acceptable behaviour. Images of peta are found throughout Asia, from the temple of Borobudur in 
Indonesia to 17th century Japanese paintings of peta. Not only is there extensive literature on 
petas, but the literature and images of peta we have access to are incredibly detailed. The evidence 
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I have provided asserts that peta as an infelicitous rebirth constituted a significant part of the 
Buddhist imaginaire. I further claim that peta served a similar function to rebirth as an animal, in 
that peta and literature on peta served as a moralising tool which arguably helped maintain the 
Buddhist imaginaire, and stability throughout the region. 
 
Conclusion  
 
  Peta, unlike animals, can easily be seen to suffer an infelicitous fate, and scholarly 
literature from Henri-Léon Feer’s 1884 description of peta to later images of peta portray the 
intense suffering of this rebirth destiny. Peta are a ghost-like semi-human being who are often 
associated with greed. However, as I have discussed above, peta are not easily defined as they have 
varying forms, some peta even experience fleeting pleasure amidst their suffering. Over time and 
culture peta have been developed and expanded upon. However, they have been a permanent 
fixture in the imaginaire of infelicitous Buddhist rebirth destinies. Peta are present in Buddhist 
literature and art, which I have discussed as evidence for my claim that peta made up a significant 
part of this imaginaire.  
In this thesis, my two major claims are that infelicities made up a substantial part of the 
Buddhist imaginaire, and that they were instrumental in providing social stability. I have argued 
following Shirkey that peta further serve the function of ‘gift’ giving, while offering a set of 
preventative means or procedures to avoid rebirth as a peta, and consoling the grieving family of 
the recent dead’. Essentially, peta and all literature and art pertaining to peta are moralising tools 
and part of a set of ‘scare tactics’ utilised by the elite to maintain society. In the same sense that 
rebirth as an animal would’ve been frightening, peta rebirth presents another frightening post-
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mortem destiny that served as a motivator for socially acceptable behaviour and as a disincentive 
for socially corrosive behaviour.  
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Chapter 3: Buddhist Hells 
 
Rebirth in hell, as a hell-being 
 
 The final infelicity in the set of Buddhist infelicities that I will consider is rebirth in one of 
the hells, as a hell-being. This fate is by far the worst and most torturous of the three rebirth 
destinies I have presented. This section will be the most detailed infelicity presented in this thesis, 
primarily for the reason that it is the most comparable with the Christian infelicity of Hell. I will 
begin this chapter with a discussion of the origin of Buddhist hells, and a consideration of Jens 
Braarvig’s claim that Buddhist hells developed from the Vedic tradition to a complex system of 
Buddhist hells. Following this section, I will continue the history of Buddhist hells with a study of 
the various hell systems that emerged prior to the standardised system that I will present in the 
following section. Based on the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra I will provide a sketch of the 
eight Buddhist hells based on this sūtra. However, in order to further my claim I will follow my 
sketch of the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra, with a brief discussion of hells outside of this sūtra 
particularly the presence of cold hells in certain hell systems and the bureaucratic system of 
Chinese Buddhist hells. It is my intention to present a discussion of Buddhist hells that furthers 
my claim that infelicities were important and served a purpose to the ruling elite in maintaining 
society.  
 
The origins of Buddhist hells. 
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Hell is not a concept unique to Buddhism, or to Asia as a geographical region. Hell and 
places similar to hell are present in other Asian religions, such as early Vedic and later Hindu 
concepts of the afterlife. I argue that in the Buddhist cosmological view, the multiple hells are the 
most important of the infelicities discussed in this thesis, as hell is the most infelicitous realm.  
 It has been claimed that Buddhist hells have roots in the early Vedic and later Hindu 
tradition. Jens Braarvig argues that prior to the acceptance of the system of hells or multiple hells 
into the Buddhist cosmological worldview, hell or a region similar to hell was ruled by Yama, King 
of the Underworld.117 It appears, however, that the realm Yama presided over was not in fact 
hellish, but rather, was a singular post-mortem realm that was more heavenly than hellish. This 
realm was not heavenly, in the sense it was lavish and filled with all the wonder one could want, 
but rather, was a place of contentment for the dead. Peace in the afterlife and the guarantee of a 
heavenly existence was dependent upon living relatives practicing particular rituals and making 
offerings, often gifting items to the dead, such as balls of rice, incense and other items to ease the 
suffering of the dead in the afterlife.118  
 Braarvig argues that ethicization is the primary reason for the division of the underworld 
into at minimum two separate post-mortem realms.119 One being felicitous and the other 
infelicitous. 
   Yama as a deity was reinvented as the ruler of hell. As the ruler of hell, Yama’s 
responsibility was to weigh each individual’s karmic debt.120  
  Hell, as an infelicitous post-mortem realm, is first mentioned in the Buddhist Canon in 
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approximately 100 B.C.E., in a set of recorded debates known as the Kathāvatthu debates.121 
Braarvig argues that perhaps the concept of hell in Buddhism can be dated earlier than 100 B.C.E., 
and makes this claim based on the dating of the Kathāvatthu debates, which are considered to be 
from the period in which Ashoka reigned 268-232 B.C.E. Hell as a topic of debate may have first 
appeared in 300 B.C.E.122 
   The Kathāvatthu debate concerning hell centres on kamma, and whether that which is 
reborn actually experiences the suffering caused by the previous self’s kamma, in the sense that 
matter of a person prior to this rebirth experiences suffering post rebirth.123 A portion of this 
debate summarizes the outcome of an argument as to whether hell is a physical place or if 
particular actions and mindsets constitute as hell.124 The orthodox view prevails in this set of 
debates, and states that hell is a physical place in which one experiences great suffering.125 It is 
this view that has taken primary place in the Buddhist imaginaire. 
 
 
 
A brief history of Buddhist hells 
 
The history of Buddhist hells is much more complex and does not end with the agreement 
made at the Kathāvatthu debates. Rather, Buddhist hells, like many if not all Buddhist concepts 
transformed and expanded of overtime as Buddhism spread across Asia. Prior to discussing the 
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various images and portrayals of hell in the Buddhist world, I will first provide an outline of the 
standard formation of Buddhist hells. Similar to my previous Chapter on peta, in this section I will 
provide examples as to how Buddhist hells have transformed throughout the Buddhist world. To 
list all anomalies and variations on Buddhist hells would be impossible given the limitations of this 
thesis. However, it must be noted that there are many variations on hell throughout the Buddhist 
world. 
 The transformation of the Vedic underworld into a complex system of hells was a centuries 
long process. However, hell and the later hells have always been located beneath Jambudvīpa.126 
The earliest descriptions of hell claim that hell was an iron square, with the minor hells inside this 
square.127 The number of hells fluctuated before settling on eight major hells, though earlier texts 
suggest that there were up to ten major hells.128 The eight major hells are known by the 
punishments administered in each hell, or by the action that caused such punishment. I will 
describe the eight major hells based upon the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra, known as: Samjī
va—hell of repetition; Kālā-sūtra—black rope hell; Samghata—crowded hell; Raurava—screaming 
hell; Māhā-raurava—great screaming hell; Tapana—hell of burning heat; Pratapana—hell of great 
burning heat; and Avīci—hell of no-interval.129 The geographical position and status of each hell 
has also fluctuated. Avīci is now known to be the most terrible of all the hells has occupied a 
multitude of places in the spectrum of hells.130 
   This ongoing shifting and ordering of hells provides evidence that the Buddhist hells were 
a concept that developed and expanded over time and culture. Conceptually, Buddhist hells have 
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retained the key infelicitous element of post-mortem suffering. I have chosen to provide details of 
the tortures encountered to emphasize the incredibly complex and detailed world of Buddhist 
hells, illuminating the importance of hells in the structure of infelicities and Buddhist imaginaire. I 
have chosen to order the Buddhist hells based upon sin, as this provides insight into Buddhist 
morality and how kamma theoretically works. It is also useful to categorize the Buddhist hells in 
this manner, as it may illuminate the type of society that constituted and partook in this 
imaginaire. Following this section, I will elaborate on the cultural transformation of Buddhist hells. 
 
 
The Buddhist hells 
 
In order to describe the hells of the Buddhist imaginaire I will also discuss the sins relating 
to them and how the Buddhist hell system works. There are multiple hells and the Buddhist 
cosmological system orders them based upon sins committed, tortures suffered and the time spent 
suffering. While a rebirth in a particular hell is based on sin, the Buddhist hell system is somewhat 
accumulative, in that sin after sin after sin results in a quantity of kamma and leads to rebirth in a 
particular hell.  
 
Physical crimes:  
Samjīva—hell of repetition: killing 
 Samjīva is the first hell. It bears the lightest retribution, which is unusual given other 
religious traditions tend to emphasize killing as a particularly terrible sin. This hell is for those 
who intentionally kill, and do not place any value on the victim’s life, or have no regret for 
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killing.131 As part of the standardised system of hells, Samjīva contains sixteen minor hells. An 
example of one of these hells is the ‘Place of Excrement’.132 This minor hell is for those that have 
killed animals and do not experience remorse.133 In this minor hell, the inhabitants are tortured by 
having to stumble through ‘hot bitter dung mixed with molten copper’.134They are forced to 
consume the filth they wade through, while ‘sharp-beaked maggots inhabiting the dung enter into 
their bodies and consume their lips, teeth, tongue and everything in sight until the entire sinner is 
devoured’.135 Those that have taken the lives of others are in turn consumed and killed themselves. 
Another method of torture found in Samjīva is sinners are pierced by flying shards of a diamond 
mountain.136 As discussed the types of torture experienced by the sinner directly relate to the being 
that was intentionally killed.  
  Whilst Samjīva is a terrifying and tortuous place, in the spectrum of Buddhist hells it is 
not the worst, partially due to the tortures experienced, but primarily because the time spent in 
Samjīva is very little in comparison to time spent in avīci. 
 
Kālā-sūtra—black rope hell: stealing 
 Kālā-sūtra is the hell that one is destined to be reborn in, for not only mercilessly killing 
another being, but also for stealing.137 In this hell, demons tie the sinners to the burning ground, 
and then proceed to mark the sinners’ body with ink-blackened rope before slicing the body into 
hundreds and thousands of pieces.138 Another description of this hell claims that sinners are forced 
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by demons to carry heavy bundles across ink-blackened rope above boiling cauldrons which, they 
inevitably fall into.139 Suffering in this hell is specific to those that take objects or items that are 
not theirs to take, or they take more than necessary; simply speaking, those that are greedy and 
selfish.140 
 
Samghata—crowded hell: sexual indulgence or misconduct 
 Samghata is for those who have committed the above two sins, along with the sin of sexual 
indulgence or misconduct.141 In this hell, sinners are tormented by beautiful women who tempt 
them into climbing ‘sword trees’. The leaves of these trees are razor-sharp blades which shred the 
flesh of those foolish enough to climb them.142 Upon reaching the top of these sword trees, the 
sinner sees that the object of their affections is now on the ground below them. In order to 
continue this pursuit, the sinner must have their flesh shredded again as they clamber up and 
down the tree.143  
It is interesting to note that the temptress is able to manipulate her appearance so that the 
sinner does not remember the suffering caused by the previous subject of his desire.144 It is almost 
always women in this realm who act as temptresses, as opposed to men tempting women. Morally, 
Samghata teaches that love and lust are selfish, as they create attachment, thus creating 
suffering.145 Samghata is named after its fifteenth minor hell, a place where sinners are trapped in 
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a ‘fire-jar’.146 In this minor hell, countless small fires burn all over the sinners’ bodies until the 
flames enter their bodies and consume the sinner from the inside.147 Daigan and Alicia Matsunaga 
argue that the Samghata is related to the Fire Sermon Discourse or the Ādittapariyāya Sutta, in 
which the Buddha relates the five skandas to burning with desire or attachment.148 
 
Raurava—screaming hell: intoxicants 
 Raurava strictly speaking is the hell for those that abuse intoxicants, such as alcohol or 
other mind-altering substances.149 Arguably, this hell is primarily aimed at the monastic order, who 
must abstain from liquor and other indulgences.150 This hell is for all who indulge in intoxicants. 
To reflect the pleasure they experience from such illicit indulgences, the sinners are claimed to be 
‘chortling’ as they are captured by demons and dragged to hell.151 Raurava is not only reserved for 
those are indulgent, but for those that facilitate such indulgences such as those who sell liquor.152 
Raurava even has a space reserved for those who use liquor to manipulate others. This hell, the 
‘Hell of Complete Darkness’ is particularly terrifying.153 This hell is a place of psychological terror, 
in which sinners are pursued and tormented in complete darkness by demons.154 
 
Vocal crimes:  
Māhā-raurava, great screaming hell: lying 
  Māhā-raurava is the only hell strictly related to vocal crimes, particularly lying. Those that 
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suffer in this hell do so for the improper use of words.155 I have already claimed sins relate directly 
to punishment, as fitting, the sinners in Māhā-raurava tend to suffer punishments on the tongue 
or lips.156 Māhā-raurava is one of the hells in which imagined animals appear due to the sinners’ 
kamma. One of the minor hells, the ‘Hell of Unbearable Pain’, utilises snakes as a torture device, 
as the inhabitants have snakes born inside their bodies.157 This symbolises ill-will and anger 
towards others as well as a tendency for lying. Buddhism is a religion primarily concerned with 
salvation through truth, almost all beings will fall into this hell at some point, due to man’s nature 
to deny the truth, given what Buddhism proposes to be truths and the correct manner in which to 
live, provide a challenge to the everyday person.  
 
Mental Crimes:  
Tapana, hell of burning heat: false views 
 Tapana is the first hell for ‘mental’ sins and is primarily for those with ill thoughts. The 
image of Tapana reflects a fairly common narrative and set of images concerning  the Abrahamic 
imaginings of Hell. In Tapana, sinners’ bodies are consumed by a raging inferno. Onozawa states 
‘the general condition of Hell: dark and hot, blazing flames, worms and insects crawl everywhere, 
vultures and iron beaked birds devour hell’s inhabitants, in relation to this Tapana.’158 The views 
considered to be most damaging, and result in rebirth in Tapana, are the following: 
 
‘1. Denial of the law of cause and effect (or kamma)’ 
‘2. Denial of the existence of good and evil’ 
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‘3. Denial of dāna, which in its broadest implication covers spiritual as well as material giving in 
all phases of human life.’ 
‘4. Belief in abolishing all forms of meeting [in the sense of forming groups that may pose a 
threat to the governing body], ranging from the family to the national level.’159 
  
It is likely that during the writing of the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra, such views and ideas 
were prevalent or common enough in India and proved to be the most damaging and dangerous to 
Buddhism and the Buddhist community, given hells tend to operate as moral guidelines.160 Other 
false views include belief in deterministic astrology and fortune telling. Minor hells exist for these 
beliefs and superstitions. Daigan and Alicia Matsunaga provide detailed descriptions of all the 
minor hells in Tapana. However, I will describe only the most unusual hell, in order to show as to 
how much thought and detail Buddhist thinkers invested in hell.  
  This unusual hell is known as ‘The Diamond-beak Hornet Hell’. In this hell, sinners are 
tormented by demons, who pluck the sinners’ heads bald one strand at a time.161 The hair from 
the sinners’ heads is then stuffed into the sinners’ mouths, while diamond-beaked hornets sting 
the sinners, causing wounds from which they extract blood.162 The sinners are made to consume 
blood extracted by the hornets, which is extremely bitter to drink, yet the more they consume the 
hungrier they become.163 This hunger consumes and deceives the sinners, until they began to 
consume their own flesh.164  
The above discussion of this particular minor hell demonstrates Buddhist thinkers were 
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very inventive in imagining post-mortem punishments. It is interesting to further note, as already 
briefly mentioned, that almost all punishments relate back to the sin committed in order to be 
reborn in the said hell. This particular punishment is so unusual that it is difficult to imagine how 
it relates back to the sin of lying. However, it likely makes sense metaphorically in the sense of the 
consumption of hair is symbolic of false truths leads to further false truths or wrong beliefs, 
symbolic in the sense that the sinners consume their own flesh after being tricked by the bitter 
blood they are made to consume.  
 
Pratapana—hell of great burning heat: sexual misconduct in relation to religion 
 Pratapana is specifically for those who sexually defile religion or the religious community.165 
This hell is primarily for those who tempt monks, nuns or virtuous laywomen.166 Women appear to 
make up the majority of the sinners in Pratapana, as evidenced by the following description of a 
minor hell known as ‘The Place of Painful Hair’.167  
The Place of Painful Hair is described in a tale of a woman who seduces a virtuous monk, 
and makes threats that if the monk  does not engage in a relationship with her, she will publicly 
announce that he raped her.168 This woman is punished in The Place of Painful Hair by having 
her skin pared off by demons with a sharp-bladed knife until merely bone remains and as new soft 
flesh grows in the process is repeated.169 At other times the demons amuse themselves by peeling 
off small sections of flesh and then roasting the exposed portion.170 As she runs to escape from 
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such torment she beholds the monk that she tempted approaching her.171 Rushing into his arms to 
embrace him, the moment she touches him, the vision transforms into searing flames172  
  As a result of her sins, she suffers until her kamma is exhausted, but this is not the end of 
her misery. It is almost impossible for a woman to be reborn as a human again in the unlikely case 
that a woman takes human form again, she will be handicapped by the loss of an eye or ear, have 
a hare lip and an ugly complexion.173 During her lifetime she will be forced to spend her time 
cleaning excrement, know only subservience, and be beaten even by children.174  
 
Avīci, no interval hell: one of the five sins of Buddhism 
 Avīci is the final hell in the set of eight Buddhist hells, and is for those that have 
committed one of the five immediate sins of Buddhism, known as ānantaraya-karmā. ‘ These 
crimes are so heinous that their inevitable karmic result of descent into hell will take place 
immediately and necessarily in the next life, rather than at some unspecified vague point in the 
future, as is usual for generic karmic results...175 
 
 Buddhism has five ‘immediate’ sins, they are the following: 
 
‘1. Premeditated murder of one’s natural mother.’ 
‘2. Premeditated murder of one’s natural father.’ 
‘3. Premeditated evil intention to harm the Enlightened One and rejoicing in such an action.’ 
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‘4. With premeditated evil intention to destroy the Buddhist community.’ 
‘5. Premeditated murder of Arhats.’176 
 
It must be noted that Jonathan Silk points out that these actions must be committed with 
deliberate intention or premeditation as emphasized by the use of the word murder; as such they 
are not considered mere acts of killing, like those found in Samjīva.177 The five immediate sins are 
found in various Buddhist sūtras, the Theravada Aṅguttaranikāya (The Gradual Sayings of the 
Buddha) and the scholastic Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma-kośa are just two primary sources in which 
the five immediate sins are mentioned.178 
The five sins, like almost all other Buddhist concepts, are elaborated and expanded upon in 
a Chinese sūtra known as the Brahmajala-sūtra, adding the murder of an upādhyāya and acariya, 
monastic mentors.179 
Sufferings in Avīci are said to be a thousand times more intense than those found in 
previous hells, the mere journey to Avīci alone lasts 2,000 years.180 Sufferings in Avīci are so 
terrible that were a deva to smell the stench of Avīci they would instantly perish, while the sounds 
of those being tortured are said to be so terrifying any person who encountered Avīci would 
instantly die from fear.181 One of the minor hells in Avīci is known as the ‘Hell of Rapid Pain’, 
this hell is for sinners who have destroyed images or words of the Buddha, and have committed 
the sin of destroying the dhamma body.182 The destruction of the dhamma body denies other 
beings the opportunity to learn the dhamma, and thus prevents others from being enlightened. 
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The punishment for this sin is having molten copper and hot sand poured in one’s eyes, while 
one’s hands are sliced by demons. One spends aeons in Avīci before one is able to be reborn, and 
even then, the chance of being reborn in another infelicitous realm is high. However, salvation is 
found in the even the darkest depths of hell, through the missions of compassionate Bodhisattvas, 
who go to offer help and teach the dhamma. At times they are even able to personally rescue 
individuals from hell.  
 
 Based upon one sūtra, the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra, there is enough literary 
evidence that hell as a concept was prevalent and prominent in the mind of the Buddhist. This sū
tra was popularized throughout the Buddhist world, and as I have described above, is detailed on 
various realms of hell and the sins committed in order to be reborn in hell. However, hell imagery 
exists through the Buddhist world as well in the following section I shall provide details of other 
literature and images of hell. 
 
 
Hells outside of the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra 
 
  Hells like peta and the rebirth as an animal developed and expanded over time and culture. 
To demonstrate the prominence of hell in the Buddhist imaginaire, I will further my argument by 
discussing the expansion of hell doctrine and the various forms that hell has taken over Buddhist 
history. 
  Ineke van Put discusses hells broadly speaking in ‘East Asian Buddhism’, in her two 
articles ‘Some Remarks on the Eight Great Hells in the Northern Buddhist Tradition’ and ‘The 
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Names of Buddhist hells in East Asian Buddhism’. Van Put addresses the changes in Buddhist 
cosmology as Buddhism spread to China and Japan. The first change van Put addresses is the 
development of a cosmology known as the Chinese Dirghagama; this cosmology expands upon the 
Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra and mentions a second series of hells, that van Put states may 
have been called the Arbuda series.183 Van Put argues that the Arbuda series can be traced to the 
Kokalika-sūtra, and that these sets of secondary hells are known as the cold hells of the Northern 
tradition.184 The cold hells are not a new feature in the academic study of Buddhist cosmology as 
Przyluski argued in 1923 that the Buddhist cold hells we're not a unique development to 
Buddhism, but rather, developed concurrently with or had origins in Iran with Mazdeizm and 
Zoroastrianism, given that Iran was a bridge between East and West.185 It has also been suggested 
that the cold hells developed as Buddhism moved north and entered the cold regions of India and 
Tibet. The development of the Kokalika originally just changed the time sinners spent in hell, but 
later developed into a second series independent of the Eight Hot Hells, by later texts such as the 
Mahaprajna and Kosa, these hells become known as the Cold hells186  
  Van Put also addresses the issue of the hierarchy of hells shifting before settling the 
structure I discussed above in relation to Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra. Van Put argues that it 
is likely that the structure developed and settled based on opposition to the Buddhist heavens.187 
This structure known as the Mahaniraya structure was replaced by six heavens and six hells, Avīci 
as the hell of hells become the opposite of Paranirmoitavasavartin.188  
  The elaboration of hells is not the only change to Buddhist hells over time and culture. 
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China provides a particular rich case study as to how hells developed. China is especially unique in 
that hell was administered and governed by a set of Ten Kings.189 This governing system mirrored 
the earthly bureaucracy of China.190 These kings were not immortal deities in the sense that Yama 
was, as the presiding Lord of Hell. Rather, they were a succession of Kings who occupied these 
ten bureaucratic post-mortem roles.191 Unlike in early India, Yama does not occupy the role of 
ruler in Chinese depictions of hell; rather, he is considered to be the fifth king.192 Chinese 
Buddhism embraced hell imagery wholeheartedly, pictorials of hell were found in markets and it is 
thought that such images were utilised by ‘itinerant storytellers’ in performances across China and 
Central Asia.193 Other representations of hell in China include the story known as “The Record of 
a Returned Soul” a sūtra known as ‘The Sūtra Spoken by the Buddha on the Prophecy to the Four 
Orders on King Yama Concerning the Seven Feasts to be Practiced Preparatory to Rebirth in Pure 
Land’.194 In this brief section I have attempted to demonstrate how hell developed over time and 
culture, particular in the development of cold hells in particular traditions as well as the unique 
Chinese bureaucratic take on hells. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The system of Buddhist hells is the final infelicity in the structure and hierarchy of 
Buddhist infelicities and arguably the worst fate of all three. Buddhist hells are not a recent 
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development but can be dated back to 300 B.C.E. Over time the Vedic concept of the afterlife was 
transformed into an infelicitous post-mortem fate that at its inception was not standardised 
system. I have chronicled the systemization of Buddhist hells into the set of eight major hells 
based upon the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra, in doing this I have presented the complexity 
and detail that Buddhist thinkers undertook in the creation of hells. I provided further evidence for 
the complexity of Buddhist hells by sketching the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra with details 
and descriptions of the specifics of some of the minor hells. The Buddhist imaginaire, however, is 
much more varied and complex than one sūtra, and I have attempted to counter this by providing 
a brief discussion as to how hells have undergone transformation whether it be through the 
development of another set of hells or through the bureaucratization of hell in the Chinese case. 
Hells in the set of Buddhist infelicities made up a significant if not the most significant portion of 
this set of post-mortem fates. Buddhist hells are complex and extremely detailed, though literature 
is the primary source of hells, visual images of hell also circulated throughout the Buddhist world, 
providing a frightening prospect to those who did not adhere to socially acceptable behaviour. As a 
result hells provided another infelicity that could be employed by the ruling elite to maintain 
society through the propagation of hell and the idea that if one acted in a manner that was socially 
corrosive one would suffer immense pain following rebirth if not immediately.  
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Appendix to Chapter 3: Ichhantikas: a complication of the Buddhist cosmos 
 
 The final fate I will discuss is that of the icchantika. This fate cannot entirely be 
considered a felicity as it is not a state one is reborn into, but rather, a state one creates through 
their own ignorance and actions. I have chosen to discuss this state as I believe it offers insight 
into how Buddhists thought about soteriology, which arguably is the foundation of Buddhism, 
given it is a religion that states all will eventually achieve nirvana. Thinking about icchantikas also 
provides a point of comparison for the Christian concept of eternal damnation, and therefore, is 
useful in forming an overall typology of infelicity that may be applicable to multiple religious 
imaginaires. 
  Buddhist texts tell not only of rebirth destinies as a result of kamma, but of a particular 
special fate for those particularly evil, or ignorant of the dhamma. This is special fate is that of the 
icchantika, a being or perhaps more apt though incorrect soul that is some sense damned. Those 
who are icchantikas have committed the four parajikas or rules relating to expulsion from the 
sangha i.e.: engaging in sexual intercourse and have also committed the five sins of immediate 
retribution.195 Jonathan Silk argues that icchantikas are the closest to eternal damnation in the 
Buddhist mindset, as it is said that icchantikas are unable to be awoken to the dhamma and 
therefore suffer endless rebirth.196 Icchantikas essentially abandon all goodness and cannot attain 
nirvana as they have ‘cast aside scriptures of Bodhisattvas, and has professed the calumny that 
these [scriptures] do not conform to the liberation [taught] in the canonical scriptures and 
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vinaya.’197 Icchantikas are mentioned in the Mahaparinirvāṇa-sūtra as those ‘the most wicked 
being’, and ‘devoid of good roots’.198 It must be noted, however, that while icchantikas are 
considered to be damned, they are not permanent residents of hell, as stated earlier on in my 
discussion of kamma and rebirth; all rebirth destinies are considered suffering so icchantikas 
experience the various realms for eternity.199 
 Icchantikas, however, present a complication in the soteriology of the Buddhist world, 
Buddhism as Silk argues is ‘overwhelming positive’, in that it believes that all beings will attain 
nirvana.200 The presence of iccchantikas in the Mahaparinirvāṇa-sūtra is particularly problematic. 
Ming-Wood Liu argues due to the emphasis placed on Buddha-nature in this particular sutra.201 
Buddha-nature is the concept that all sentient beings are imbued with special ‘seed’ that destines 
all being for Buddhahood.202 
 
 
 
  
                                               
197
 Silk, “Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism,” 270. 
198
 Ming-Wood Liu, “The Problem of the Icchantika in the Mahayana Mahaparinirvana Sutra,” The Journal of the 
International Association of Buddhist Studies 7 (1984): 58. 
199
 Silk, “Good and Evil in Indian Buddhism,” 274. 
200
 Ibid., 282. 
201
 Liu, “The Problem of the Icchantika,” 59. 
202
 Ibid. 
62 
 
Conclusion to Part I 
 
  I have outlined above are the three infelicitous post-mortem fates of the Buddhist 
imaginaire, in providing descriptions and histories of Buddhist infelicities, I have argued that 
infelicities were a significant part of the Buddhist imaginaire.  Given not only their sheer 
existence, but their prominence in Buddhist literature, the infelicities arguably constituted a 
significant part of the imaginaire proposed by Collins. There is significant literary evidence for 
rebirth as an animal, rebirth as a peta and rebirth in one of the many hells. Not only does such 
literature exist, but it is extremely detailed and complex. The literature on petas and Buddhist hells 
serves as particularly strong evidence for the existence and prominence of infelicities in the 
Buddhist imaginaire, as the Petavatthu which I have discussed above, is an early Buddhist text 
detailing the lives of peta. Buddhist hells feature in many sūtras, which I have listed above. 
However, my case study of the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra sūtra illuminates the incredibly 
complex and detailed world of Buddhist hells.  
  The last point of interest in the study of Buddhist infelicities is not only how detailed they 
are in describing the particular tortures of such realms, but they also include significant details as 
to what types of behaviour result in an infelicitous rebirth. I believe that the linking of specific sins 
with specific post-mortem tortures serves as a particularly strong indicator that infelicities served 
as a religious tool to discourage socially corrosive behaviour. Such tales such as the Petavatthu also 
serve a similar purpose, in that they were both entertainment and educational to the laity as to 
how not to behave. Literature is not the only form in which infelicities were presented, other 
images such as paintings also provided education for the laity. 
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 Literary evidence and the detail of infelicities also provides significant material to make the 
argument: infelicities in opposition to felicities served as disincentives for socially corrosive 
behaviour, and thus were a stabilizing tool utilised by the elite to maintain power. Stephen Teiser 
in his article “‘Having Once Died and Returned to Life:’ Representations of Hell in Medieval 
China,” states: 
 
    For an uneducated, non-monastic audience, representations of hell are used as an 
ethical lure: the tortures of the underworld are intended to scare the unwitting layperson 
into a Buddhist way of life. Representations of hell serve a different purpose for monks: for 
them, the torments of hell are used to illustrate to mediators the power of their own mental 
fabrications, the manner in which they are responsible for constructing the world around 
them and for filling that world not just with the tortures of hell but also with yaksas, ogres, 
and less corporeal forms of self-doubt and delusion.203 
 
He goes on to state:  
 
Yet it is precisely these extra-canonical representations of hell that were determinative for 
the vast majority of people in the Buddhist-influenced cultures of Asia.204 
 
I argue that these two statements can be extended to all infelicities of the Buddhist imaginaire. 
Rebirth as an animal, peta or in hell were used as ‘ethical lures’ that scared the layperson into the 
Buddhist tradition, which benefited both the Buddhist order and the ruling elite. Such fear 
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discouraged socially corrosive behaviour, while felicities provided the reward for acting in a 
manner that was beneficial to society. In being the manipulators of such worlds the monastic order 
continued to stake their claim as ‘legitimators’ amongst the ruling elite.  
 Infelicities of the Buddhist imaginaire are complex set of post-mortem fates, evidence of 
which can be found throughout the Buddhist world, be it in literature or visual imagery. Infelicities 
were an important part of this imaginaire in the sense that they constituted it, but also in the 
function they provided in maintaining society. 
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Part II 
Comparison with Christianity, and a General Model 
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Chapter 5: Christian Infelicities 
 
Imagining infelicities in the Christian imaginaire 
 
  In contrast to Buddhism (as seen from a Western perspective), Christianity has been 
identified as a religion which has concerns or concepts relating to post-mortem punishment. 
Infelicities in the Christian imaginaire are limited in a sense to ‘Hell proper’ and the somewhat 
semi-infelicitous realm of Purgatory . 
In this section, I will begin by giving a history of the Christian concept of Hell, as I did in 
my chapter on Buddhist infelicities. The history and the formation of Christian Hell and literature 
concerning Hell will provide a reference against the Buddhist infelicities. This survey will hopefully 
offer further insight into how imaginaires in Agraria were developed and elaborated upon.  
Following my introductory history, I will survey the particular tortures and sins referenced in 
Christian Hell. This survey will provide further evidence towards a discussion as to how infelicities 
may operate throughout Agraria. As part of my section on Christian literature concerning Hell, I 
will discuss Dante’s imagining of Hell in Inferno. Upon the publication of Inferno, Hell was 
arguably upon the minds of medieval thinkers, and Dante’s Inferno presents the epitome of 
Christian Hell literature. The final section on Hell will consider the concept of eternal damnation, 
which is particularly important in thinking about a how Hell or other infelicities operate in Agraria. 
In writing a comparative chapter, I intend for Collins’s model to be made more applicable. 
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In this introduction, I have stated that Purgatory can be considered to be semi-infelicitous 
post-mortem realm. However I will argue for Purgatory to be considered an infelicity in the 
Christian imaginaire. I will make this argument by first providing a history of Purgatory and 
debates concerning Purgatory prior to its acceptance in the canon. My main claim for Purgatory to 
be considered an infelicity is the function of Purgatory. I will consider the function, along with the 
issue of the sale of indulgences, and then conclude the chapter.  
  
 
 
 
History of Christian Hells 
 
  Dimitris J. Kyrtatas argues that the concept of Christian Hell should be considered a 
development of the Christian imaginaire and particularly a development outside of Christian 
doctrine.205  Christian Hell was thought about extensively by Christian thinkers who were not 
contributors to the Bible.206 Hell, as a concept, was already present in the Jewish imaginaire and N. 
Wyatt claims that perhaps we can even consider Hell as a pan-Mediterranean tradition.207 Early 
Christian visions of eternal life after death were of a place of contentment, not entirely heavenly, 
and a place that we would most certainly not think of as hellish. These early visions are similar to 
visions of  the afterworld in the early Buddhist and Vedic imaginaires. Those that did not believe 
in God, it is claimed, go to Gehenna, not an entirely horrific place, but a place where both body 
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and soul resided, in death.208 Even in the earliest post-mortem visions  of Christianity, not being 
with Christ or having some kind of existence after death was a fate so awful in itself that 
additional post-mortem punishment was unnecessary.209 Early forms of eternal punishment were 
eternal death, or eternal fire, in the sense Gehenna is the extinction of life, as it is only with Christ 
that one can enjoy eternal life.210       
   Kyrtatas argues that the Christian transformation of Gehenna and early imaginings of 
eternal punishment and Hell emerged due to ethicization, similar to Jens Braarvig’s argument 
concerning the ethicization of the Vedic afterlife into a system of Hells.211 The Book of Revelation 
envisages another post-mortem fate, or more sinister vision of Gehenna, in which souls experience 
two deaths and two resurrections.212 After first death, in which the actual corpse physically dies, all 
‘good’ souls reside underneath the temple altar, where they await resurrection. These souls who 
experience first resurrection are a type of special dead or ‘martyrs’.213 After 1,000 years, all dead are 
resurrected and judged according to their deeds.214 Those who are judged to be guilty of sin are 
hurled into ‘the burning lake of fire and sulphur’ along with death and Hades, to meet their 
second death. At second death, both body and soul are completely annihilated; second death is 
final.215 However, Satan endures eternal torture in the lake of fire and sulphur, due to his 
immortality.216 
 Christian Hell further undergoes ‘popular’ exploration and transformation with the 
Apocalypse of Peter, an early but vital piece of Christian literature that expounds upon the idea of 
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post-mortem punishment.217 The Apocalypse of Peter envisages all resurrected sinners being 
tortured according to their past crimes, and the lake of fire and sulphur and worms become 
instruments of torture, instead of consumption.218 Eternal damnation remained a point of 
controversy within the Church during its formative years. Augustine's City of God, written in the 
5th century, ‘championed’ eternal damnation, and the belief that after death, there were two 
primary fates, one felicitous, and the other infelicitous.219 Those that fell into Hell were tortured 
for eternity, and further suffered an even more horrific loss, that of being forbidden from the 
Kingdom of God.220  
  Augustine’s vision of Hell was popularised during the Renaissance, a period in which the 
Church rapidly elaborated and maintained belief in Hell. The highly educated religious elite such 
as the Pope and his cardinals tended not to expound on the actualities of Hell, though Priests and 
other religious figures who were the primary contacts with the laity had a tendency to invoke 
hellscapes in their sermons.221 During this period, Bernstein argues a ‘rapid proliferation during 
the Renaissance of detailed vernacular tracts on Hell reflects an expanding grassroots belief in 
punishment after death’, as evidenced by texts such as Dante Alighieri's Inferno.222 A surge in Hell 
literature and belief in Hell increased up until the 15th C.E., in which the construction of Hell 
stagnated and belief in Hell was wholly normalized.223 
 I have not considered the histories of the precedents of Christian imaginings of Hell from 
early Jewish and Hellenistic visions of the afterlife, partially because the limitations of this study, 
and due to ongoing debates regarding the lineage of Christian Hell. Next will be an examination of 
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the types of infelicity, or specific types of punishment imagined in Jewish and Christian texts.  
 
 
Ancient punishments in Christian Hell 
 
  Martha Himmelfarb’s Tours of Hell: An Apocalyptic Form in Jewish and Christian 
Literature utilises tables which chart lists of tortures and the sins relating to them. In this section I 
will discuss some of the punishments encountered in Jewish and Christian Hell(s).  The geography 
of the Buddhist hells correlates directly to the sins committed and the tortures suffered. However, 
early Christian imaginings of Hell were not so structured. Geographically, Jewish imaginings of 
Sheol, another post-mortem realm in the Jewish imaginaire, are similar to early Vedic images of 
the afterlife, in that Sheol and the pitr-loka, are unspecified regions in which the dead exist, where 
they neither suffer nor enjoy unworldly heavenly pleasures. Rather, this place appears to be a void 
that the dead inhabit. However, Sheol did contain regions for those that had committed particular 
sins or behaved in a manner that was considered immoral.224 Sheol is unlike later models of post-
mortem infelicity, which were structured geographically, at times centred on or arranged in a 
hierarchy, demonstrating or categorising sins or behaviour that was socially corrosive.  
 The most prevalent torture in early models of Christian Hell is hanging.225 The limb most 
active in the sin committed is the limb which is hung, though this often extended to other parts of 
the body, such as hair and breasts for women.226  
  Reference to punishments suffered in Hell are elusive within the Gospels, as is the subject 
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of  eternal damnation, a topic I will discuss at length later. References to post-mortem punishment 
are at best difficult to find in Paul and other early Christian writings.227 Paul makes reference to 
‘evildoers’, though it  is unknown what punishment those who are referred to as ‘evildoers’ will 
suffer. However, it is stated that evildoers will receive ‘wrath and fury...tribulation and distress.’228 
This statement may refer to ultimate death, rather than eternal life in the Kingdom of God.  
  Later passages in the synoptic Gospels imagined a larger more detailed and structured 
Hell.229 It must be noted that throughout Mark 9.43-48 and Matthew 25.31-46 Hell is referred to as 
Gehenna, whereas in Luke 16.19-31, Hell is referred to as Hades or Sheol.230 The Gospel of Mark 
is the first and earliest gospel to make reference to fire as a torture device in Hell. He states that it 
is best for the sinner to sacrifice the sinful limb, than to burn in the unquenchable fire of 
Gehenna.231 Matthew describes Hell as a place where ‘Servants who do not prepare for the return 
of their master will be punished with banishment to ‘the outer darkness; there men will weep and 
gnash their teeth’ (25.30; cf 24.51).232      
 The Book of Revelation expands further on the concept of Hell, and brings in imagery 
such as that of the dragon, and of Satan taking form as a beast.233 Those that do not believe in 
God further suffer the wrath of God, as He sends out plagues and curses evildoers with illness, 
though once again it is emphasized that it is only Satan, the false prophet and beast, who is cursed 
to suffer and burn eternally.234  
As mentioned, Bernstein argues that images of Hell began to multiply and became 
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increasingly elaborate from 1000 A.D onwards.235 Prior to my study of the imagery found in Dante 
Alighieri's Inferno, arguably one of the most complex images of Hell, I will survey earlier Hell 
imagery outside the Bible.  
 
  
Punishments in Christian Hell from St. Peter’s Apocalypse and other Pre-Dante visions 
 
   Almost all visions of Hell include the image of fire, frequently an unquenchable fire that 
burns forever. Hanging also becomes increasingly common as a post-mortem punishment.236 St. 
Peter’s Apocalypse claims that murderers will be tortured by terrifying and venomous beasts, while 
their victims watch on. Fetuses who were aborted are able to take the form of children and pierce 
their mothers with lightning bolts from their eyes.237 Those who deceive others will have their lips 
cut off. Persecutors are made to suffer the endless pain of having a worm constantly eat their 
entrails, and idol worshippers are driven to madness by devils who pursue them.238  
  To list further tortures from St. Peter’s Apocalypse is not productive nor conducive to this 
study, although it is useful to survey several Hell-tours, in order to assess whether similar tortures 
for particular sins are repeated. St. Paul’s Apocalypse contains varying tortures, though there are 
similar patterns of torture found in this vision, especially for those that speak ill, or false truths, 
tortures of the lips and tongue are common.239 Sorcerers or witches are made to suffer in great pits 
or pools of blood, while a frequent punishment for women who defiled their virginity is to be led 
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away to darkness by angels.240 St. Paul’s Apocalypse elaborates and expands upon on the 
Apocalypse of St. Peter. I argue that it is an elaboration on St. Peter’s Apocalypse, as St. Paul 
introduces regions of Hell, and begins to create a hierarchy of sin. It is useful to this study to 
examine the changes made to Hell imagery over time, as this may illuminate the social conditions 
of the time.241  
  A 12th C.E religious text on an Irish knight known as Visio Tnugdali or Tundale’s vision 
expands upon the concept of regional or geographically mapped Hell, in which sins are arranged 
hierarchically, with the worst sins found at greater depths or in the deepest valleys of Hell.242 
Tundale’s vision is unusual as it presents a set of imagined beasts which previously had not 
appeared in earlier visions or tours of Hell.243 Imagined or mythical creatures are prominent in this 
vision, though the beast, Acheron, is the most terrifying of all creatures in Tundale’s Hell.244 
Acheron is a monstrous beast, and in his mouth live two giants, Fergusus and Conallus. Acheron 
belches fire towards sinners while ‘unworldly’ souls force sinners to enter his putrid mouth.245 The 
sinners are those accused of greed.  
   Tundale’s journey through the various realms of Hell and eventually meets Lucifer in the 
deepest part of Hell.246 Other earlier visions of Hell provide descriptions of Lucifer, though 
Tundale’s is the first in which the journeyman actually encounters Lucifer and is able to describe 
both Lucifer and his realm. Lucifer is described as a beast with one thousand hands, each hand 
with twenty fingers, and he has a long sharp tail and an iron beak for a mouth.247  
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  Tundale’s vision is useful for the study of pre-Dante visions of Hell, as it is offers a new 
detailed vision of Hell, and builds on the Apocalpyses of St. Peter and St. Paul. Although 
Tundale’s vision retains similar themes, and continues the tradition that the sin being directly 
related to post-mortem torture, Tundale’s vision expands upon earlier visions of Hell. 
 
 
 Dante’s Hell 
 
   Dante’s Hell, like many Christian images of Hell takes literary licence in envisioning Hell 
how the author encounters or imagines Hell. Of interest to my thesis in Dante’s Inferno is the 
transformation of particular imagery and motifs, which gave rise to new symbols of Hell. Dante’s 
vision first diverges from earlier versions, as this tale begins in a region known as the Dark Forest 
before Dante is led to the Gate of Hell. At the Gate of Hell, Acheron appears.248 However, unlike 
Tundale’s vision, in which Acheron is a monstrous giant, in Dante’s vision Acheron is a river, 
which those who have sinned are forced to cross to reach Hell.249 Acheron is the geographical 
boundary which divides the cowardly souls, those not holy or faithful enough for Heaven nor 
sinful enough for Hell.250 After crossing Acheron, Dante enters Limbo, the first circle in his 
narrative of Hell this circle is for those that are virtuous but did not know of or accept Christ.251  
  The characterisation of each realm is not unique. However, in Inferno, I claim, Dante’s 
narrative is particularly focused on personality traits, as opposed to specific sins, which I consider 
unusual given the very detailed vision Dante writes. Such traits are usually represented by 
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historical characters who appear as the embodiment of a particular behaviour or sin. The first 
realm of Hell, characterised by Lust, in this realm Dante encounters Cleopatra; Dido; Helen of 
Troy; and Paris her lover and abductor.252 Dante’s Hell is unusual as it draws upon classical Greek 
and Roman mythology, particularly characters and creatures of the classics. Inferno is at times 
political and very personal, this is another unusual feature of Dante’s Hell. Because of the political 
and personal nature of Dante’s Hell, at times it cannot be considered part of the generalised 
Christian imaginaire, as it is specific to the period in which it was written and published as well as 
the geographical regions of Dante’s life. Outside of the period in which Inferno was written and 
published,  Inferno may have presented a challenge to its readers. The detailed nature of Inferno is 
not unique, as many other imaginaires including the Buddhist imaginaire contain narratives of Hell 
that are specific to a particular region and period. However, Dante’s Hell remains important, and 
is arguably the pinnacle of the Latinate Christian imaginaire in regards to infelicitous post-mortem 
existences. I make this claim as Inferno presents a complex vision that provides a summary of all 
Christian concepts relating to Hell.  
In discussing the Christian infelicity of Hell, I have shown that infelicities share similarities 
across a broad expanse of time, culture and religion. Infelicities in both the Buddhist and Christian 
cases underwent a series of transformations prior to settling on a system of post-mortem fates, 
whether they be separate worlds or regions found in a particular place, like the Christian Hell. 
Dante’s imagining of Hell provides insight into the final development of Christian Hell doctrine, 
and particularly the society that the Christian imaginaire occupied.  
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Understanding sin in Christianity 
 
  In this thesis, I have argued that there is correlation between certain sins and particular 
tortures, as evidenced by my survey of the Saddharma-smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra and infelicities in the 
Buddhist imaginaire. In the following section, I will argue that the Christian imaginaire is similar, 
in that the above sections concerning punishment in the Christian imaginaire demonstrate that 
there is a link between sin and particular tortures. The link between sins and tortures is 
fascinating,  and while we cannot rely on the condemnation of certain behaviours to tell us of the 
particular concerns of the society of this study, it is useful to consider what may have informed an 
imaginaire. This is particularly true in understanding why the elite would want to discourage 
certain behaviours.  
 Martha Himmelfarb’s study is particularly useful in looking at interest in or particular 
emphasis on behaviours that were not conducive to community growth. Himmelfarb’s study covers 
both Judaism and Christianity and offers an insight into both communities' histories. 
  Himmelfarb notes that early Christian understandings of Hell, were usually in reference to 
sins such as abortion, adultery and fornication all of these are mentioned in both St. Peter’s and 
Paul’s Apocalypses.253 As Hell literature was elaborated over time and culture, additional sins are 
mentioned in such tours and visions, and Dante’s Inferno as the peak of Hell literature contains 
regions for both particular or more generalised behaviours: Lust; Gluttony; Avarice & Prodigality; 
Wrath & Sullenness; Heresy; Murder; Suicide; Blasphemy; Sodomy & Usury; Fraud; Pimping & 
Seducing, Flattery, Simony and Sorcery, Political Corruption, Hypocrisy, More Fraud; Theft, 
Fraudulent Rhetoric; Divisiveness & Falsification and lastly Caina, Antenora, Ptolmea & Judecca.  
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 The expansion of sin allows for some insight into the type of society that required such an 
imaginaire, and more specifically Agraria as a global phenomena. Many of the sins or types of 
behaviours that are considered socially corrosive in the Buddhist imaginaire are also found in 
Christian imaginaire. If this study was extended, it would be useful to create a table of 
categorizations that was able to link sins with particular punishments, and even dating the 
appearance of sin in relation to particular histories. This study is speculative, but it would appear 
that in both the Latinate Christian and Buddhist imaginaire, sin exists in relation to the 
elaboration of Hell literature and the development the Agrarian political elite. I argue that this is 
particularly evident in the hierarchy of sins, and the development of sins in Latinate Christian 
doctrine, as there is a shift from active or particularly violent sins that directly affect human life, 
i.e., abortion, murder towards socially divisive behaviour, such as fraud, political corruption etc. 
However, it must be noted Dante’s Inferno as a pinnacle of medieval Hell literature, still 
emphasizes fratricide and patricide, with Caina and Ptolmea part of the final ninth circle of 
Dante’s Hell. 
 
 
Eternal damnation: a debate 
 
  Earlier in this study, I have mentioned the issue of eternal damnation, which is particularly 
relevant in thinking about how my final typology will look. Eternal damnation is unique to the 
Christian imaginaire in that the Buddhist world of infelicities asserts that no state is permanent. 
Early Christian discussions of Hell seem to have not viewed Hell and its inhabitants as 
permanently damned; rather, this seems to be later development that I will discuss in this section. 
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This discussion of eternal damnation and the issue of icchantikas will provide further complexities 
to the final typology of this thesis, damnation as a concept is further fascinating in that they offer 
a particular insight into both societies and particular histories they may have undergone in order 
to develop such beliefs. 
  Augustine’s City of God championed eternal damnation in the 5th century, with the belief 
that the spiritually damned suffered both physical and spiritual tortures.254 Eternal damnation was 
considered standard Hell doctrine by the medieval period, and many of the Hell tours or visions 
that I have discussed state that the spiritually damned suffer eternally. I argue that, in thinking 
about eternal damnation, an insight into the limits of a religions soteriology can be considered as 
religions elaborate and expand. This is arguably the most fascinating insight into the differences 
between the Buddhist and Christian imaginaires.  
  I will survey various understandings of eternal damnation and the debate surrounding this 
belief, before discussing at length the potential differences this may make for my typology of 
infelicities. Augustine’s characterisation of eternal damnation is arguably one of the most 
important Christian theological pieces of literature concerning eternal damnation. Augustine 
imagines that the damned, though they suffer unbearable pain at the hand of God, are still 
nonetheless blessed, in the sense that existence itself is preferable to non-existence.255 Augustine 
argues that the damned in their suffering only wish for their pain to cease, rather than for their 
entire existence to cease altogether.256 This belief is etched in the following quote ‘And truly the 
very fact of existing is by some natural spell so pleasant, that even that they are wretched wish not 
that they themselves be annihilated, but that their misery be so.’ (Augustine, City of God, XI, 27.) 
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This argument appears to draw on the limited post-mortem imaginings of The Bible, particularly 
the fact that existence draws precedent over total annihilation and death. This pre-disposition 
towards immortality at all costs is particularly interesting in the way that it restructures the 
imaginaire. Augustine is not the only theologian to expound on the issue of eternal damnation, 
Thomas Aquinas argued that eternal damnation was justified, and for multiple tortures to be 
employed against the damned.257 Aquinas, like Augustine, believed that Hell was the creation of 
God, and even that Hell is sustained by the breath of God himself.258  
 Although eternal damnation was accepted amongst medieval thinkers, it was a topic of 
debate up until the fifth century and a debate that has continued, with scholars questioning the 
greatness and goodness of a God who is unable to forgive all his children. Eternal damnation and 
thus ultimate salvation, eternal life in Heaven, are the primary differences between the Buddhist 
and Latinate Christian imaginaires resulting in limitations on how many potential post-mortem 
fates can exist. The issue of eternal damnation questions the limitations of the soteriological basis 
of a religion, as well as the limits of a world saviour, like Shakyamuni Buddha and Jesus Christ. 
 
Purgatory; infelicity or felicity 
 
  In my introduction to this chapter on Christian infelicities I made mention of the issue of 
Purgatory and whether it can be considered a proper infelicity. Given I have argued that the post-
mortem fates of the Buddhist imaginaire are infelicitous, I will argue that Purgatory is an 
infelicitous state based not only on the actual fact and tortures of Purgatory but also on its place 
and purpose in the Christian imaginaire. I will give a brief summary of the history of Purgatory 
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prior to discussing how it fits in the Christian imaginaire. Purgatory I believe will be very 
important to my discussion of how we think and discuss infelicities in Agraria. I argue this because 
it is unusual in the Christian narrative of post-mortem fates. 
 Purgatory was conceived much later than Heaven or Hell, and its origins are at best murky. 
However, it is similar to Hell in the sense that it is not referenced explicitly in the Bible. 
References to a ‘refining fire’ are found in the Book of Malachi, and in the Second book of the 
Maccabees, it is said that sins can be forgiven by God even after death, if the living offer 
prayers.259 Other Biblical references are the following quotes and tales. The first statement in the 
New Testament by Christ himself states:  
   
‘Therefore I tell you, people will be forgiven for every sin and blasphemy, but blasphemy 
against the Spirit will not be forgiven. Whoever speaks a word against the Son of Man will 
be forgiven, but whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this 
age or in the age to come.’260 
 
Another story that Walls argues has given credence to Purgatory is ‘the story of the rich man and 
Lazarus, which depicts those in Hell as aware of those in the bosom of Abraham, and vice-versa. 
This text inspired not only speculation about different regions between Heaven and Hell that may 
be occupied by the departed dead as they await final judgment, but also suggested the possibility 
that at least some of those in Hell might be able to ameliorate their condition.’261 
  However, Purgatory really emerges as concept amongst Greek thinkers and theologians. 
Previous visions such as that of Perpetua’s contributed to the early doctrine of Purgatory, as did 
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Cyprian of Carthage’s belief that weak believers could still be admitted to communion, after they 
paid penance. Such thinkers such as Origen and Augustine debated the salvative powers of God, 
considering what happened to those that had acted morally but had little faith.262 Thoughts on the 
classification of sin led to categorizations of persons prior to death which determined their post-
mortem fate. Origen distinguished between the righteous, those guilty of lesser sins and mortal 
sinners.263 Augustine expanded on this categorization by determining two categories that are 
parallel to those guilty of lesser sins that are known as those who are neither good and those that 
are neither bad.264 By the 12th century, Augustine's fourfold class was reduced to a threefold class 
that matched up with geography of the post-mortem Christian world, as the doctrine of Purgatory 
was well on its way to affirmation by the Roman Catholic Church in 1439.265  
 A major issue in the formation and affirmation of Purgatory was the actual location of 
Purgatory: Was it beneath or above this world, heavenly or hellish a place of punishment or place 
of rest before entering the Kingdom of Heaven? Augustine affirmed that prayers for the dead were 
able to offer salvation. However, he was reluctant to agree with Origen in that all souls would 
eventually be saved, it is likely that due to this perspective that Augustine placed Purgatory closer 
to Hell and emphasized its tortures.266 Purgatory was considered closer to Hell up until the 
publication of Dante’s Purgatoria, the Church emphasized that Purgatory was closer to Hell, as 
this encouraged reform in prior to death and encouraged the sale of indulgences which I shall 
discuss in an upcoming section on the economics of Purgatory. Dante as with his other insights 
into the post-mortem Christian world offered a new perspective on Purgatory, and viewed 
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Purgatory as a place of hope, rather than punishment.267 Dante like previous theologians before 
him imagines Purgatory as a mountain that one must climb in order to be cleansed of sin.268 
Dorothy Sayers argues that Dante is the supreme poet of joy, in that he creates an overriding 
mood of hope in Purgatoria. However, this arguably did not wholly agree with the Church’s stance 
on Purgatory as a post-mortem fate.269 But for many believers it offered hope that their prayers 
were able to aid familial members who may have been suffering in Purgatory. 
  Purgatory’s geographical location not only was of debate but the actual nature and 
physicality of Purgatory was up for debate. Purgatory in artistic depictions appears similar to Hell 
in the sense that it is often filled with fire and punishments to emphasize the post-mortem 
purging of sin.270 Fire was not the only motif used in describing Purgatory, as it times it was also 
considered to be a cold pit in which sinners were not punished but did not enjoy the luxury of 
Heaven, as evidenced by Tundale’s vision.271 Jacques Le Goff states that common motives of 
medieval Purgatory, at a point where Purgatory had been affirmed by the Roman Catholic Church, 
were: darkness, fire, torture, the bridge as ordeal and passageway, mountains and rivers to be 
crossed.272 By the time Purgatory was affirmed in 1439, images of Purgatory came to resemble 
Hell; often the only difference in the portrayal of Purgatory was the inclusion of angels offering 
salvation. Other images portrayed Purgatory as a wide expanse at which one end lay a pit in which 
sinners fell to Hell, and at the other was a ‘flowery place where you see these fair people so happy 
and resplendent, is where souls who are received who die having done good, but are not so perfect 
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as to merit immediate entry into the Kingdom of Heaven.’273 Oft of most importance and always 
emphasized throughout the development and affirmation of Purgatory was the need to emphasize 
that any post-mortem punishment would be much worse than anything suffered on this earth. 
Therefore, it was best to reform prior to death. 
 As stated above, a major change in the Church was the division between mortal or willful 
sins and ignorant sins. In my sections pertaining to Hell as a Christian infelicity I discussed some 
of the sins that were considered mortal sins, to give a general idea as to the function of Purgatory 
I will make a brief list behaviours that were ignorant sins as listed by Jacques Le Goff:  
 
‘Constant gossiping, immoderate laughter and excessive attachment to private property . . . 
idle use of legitimate marriage, overindulgence in eating, taking excessive pleasure in 
things, anger leading to abusive language, exaggerated interest in personal affairs, 
inattentiveness during prayers, late sleeping, undue bursts of laughter, overindulgence in 
sleep, holding back the truth, gossiping, sticking stubbornly to error, hold the false to be 
true in matters involving faith, neglect of duty, disorderly attire’.274  
 
The above types of behaviours are fairly common human interactions, and therefore were useful in 
encouraging the purchase of indulgences for remission of these particular behaviours and creating 
fear in the non-elite. It is also of interest to consider why such behaviours were detrimental to 
society. In some cases, the reasons are fairly obvious: gossiping, for instance, could arguably also 
refer to politically subversive behaviour; idle use of legitimate marriage might result in the failure 
to produce children and thus new members for the Church. Immoderate laughter, on the other 
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hand, seems to be no threat to either the ruling elite or the Church. In highlighting ignorant sins, I 
have shown how Purgatory functions as a stabilising and reforming tool utilised by the Church to 
maintain society.  
The final issue of Purgatory to discuss prior to conclusion are the socio-economic 
conditions that led to the creation and maintenance of the doctrine of Purgatory. In this final 
section I would also like to highlight the changes that Purgatory brought about for the Church 
particularly concerning indulgences and finance. Jerry Walls and Jacques Le Goff both consider 
factors that led to the creation and maintenance of Purgatory. Jerry Walls argues that there are five 
primary reasons as to why Purgatory emerged and was maintained by the Church. The first 
change Jerry Walls argues based on Jacques Le Goff’s study is the increase of tripartite models of 
ideology, which were already popular in the Middle East.275 Arguably, this change affected the way 
in which society understood time, space and numbers which led to thinking of sin as quantity.276 
This change in thinking and the understanding of sin as a quantity will be of importance in my 
typology as I attempt to write how we can see how imaginaires developed over time and what 
social changes were influential in reforming imaginaires to reflect society. The second change was 
Walls states is he believes the Church began to place emphasis on understanding sin and penance, 
given its need to discern between wilful sin and ignorant sin, and thus justice became a primary 
concern of the Church.277 Early Christianity was arguably not as concerned with the fate of the 
dead, given they believed Jesus Christ would return to earth in the near future and all souls would 
be judged at second death.278 However, belief in the imminent return of Christ was not nearly as 
prevalent at the inception of Purgatory, this change in belief led to further concern over the actual 
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state and location of the dead.279 Arguably, this also created conditions not just for the elaboration 
of the doctrine of Purgatory, but also led to the exploration and further descriptions of those who 
were received in Heaven or sent to Hell. During this period of development, the Church also 
began to explore penance and reform prior to death, and had a new appreciation for pain as a tool 
for personal and moral formation, ‘ the development of Purgatory is tightly connected with the 
emergence of a new positive understanding of the productive potential of physical suffering to 
forge identity and meaning’.280 Walls and Le Goff both argue that the 12th century was ‘an era of 
creative foment’, in which the above changes took place, the 13th century then became an era in 
which the geography of the afterlife was organized and systematized.281                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
So what effect did the inception and affirmation of Purgatory have on the Church and society? 
The main change the advent of Purgatory had on society was the sale of indulgences, which 
became one of the primary sources of income for the Church. Indulgences were a particular type 
of penance that could be brought as a remission for past sins, be they one’s own or a family 
member who was believed to be suffering in Purgatory. Indulgences tended to be brought for 
ignorant sins, those that could result in Purgatory, given that ignorant sins tended to be 
committed by most given the fairly strict rules of the Church regarding ignorant sins. Jacques Le 
Goff states that following the affirmation of Purgatory, ‘The Church was everywhere, playing its 
ambiguous roles; to discipline and to save, to justify as well as to contest the established order.’ 
Arguably, Le Goff believed the creation and affirmation of Purgatory gave the Church more 
power.282 I agree with Le Goff that the establishment of Purgatory and the division of sins into two 
categories allowed the Church to assert more power over the non-elite and the ruling elite. 
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However, it was of benefit to the ruling elite for the Church to collect indulgences as indulgences 
provided further financial gains for the elite classes. The economic gains of the Church via 
indulgences allowed the Church to further assert power in that it provided the finances required to 
build elaborate and highly decorative cathedrals which illustrated the three post-mortem fates 
thereby asserting the reality of such worlds, and encouraging the sale of indulgences as a method 
to avoid an infelicitous afterlife. 
 In my introduction to this section on Purgatory, I stated that I would argue that Purgatory 
can be considered an infelicity, based upon the actualities of Purgatory and the function it served. 
As discussed above, images of Purgatory tended to be similar to Hell, and artists often only 
distinguished between Purgatory and Hell based on the inclusion of an image of hope i.e., 
featuring salvation in images of Purgatory. Prior to Dante, the Church also maintained that 
Purgatory was closer to Hell, and that any punishment received in Purgatory would be much 
worse than any earthly punishment. Because Purgatory is a place in which the soul underwent 
post-mortem suffering, it can be considered an infelicity, even if time spent in Purgatory 
eventuated to salvation and entry into the Kingdom of Heaven. The function of Purgatory I argue 
also serves as evidence as to why Purgatory can be considered an infelicity, given it is a terrifying 
place it operated on a similar level to Hell in that it was used as a metaphorical stick to Heaven’s 
carrot. In fact, Purgatory may have even appeared more frightening than Hell given it was likely 
most souls would spend some time in Purgatory. Because Purgatory was for ignorant sins, it then 
could be used and was employed by the Church for financial gain, with the sale of indulgences 
that aided the ruling elite. Given the prevalence of ignorant sins committed by the populace, 
especially as many were somewhat unusual or common behaviours, it was easy for the church to 
sell indulgences providing financial gain for the ruling elite.  
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 Purgatory in the Christian imaginaire provided a further infelicitous post-mortem fate that 
many souls arguably believed they would encounter. Because of the frightening nature and the fact 
it was a place of post-mortem suffering I argue Purgatory can be considered a Christian infelicity. 
I further argue Purgatory can be considered a post-mortem fate given that it was employed by the 
ruling elite to maintain society through fear, but also was beneficial to the ruling elite in that the 
arrival of Purgatory brought about the sale of indulgences, creating significant economic gain to 
the Church. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
  Latinate Christian Hell appears to take a similar form to the Buddhist Hell or hells, in the 
sense that is initially a liminal place in which the dead continue to exist, but over time becomes a 
place of torture. Historically, we see similar developments in Buddhist and Christian hells, from 
their formlessness to elaborate visions that in great detail describe the multiple terrifying tortures 
suffered by those who have sinned. Hell literature and imagery appears to have been elaborated on 
sporadically throughout history, Hell literature particularly flourished in medieval Europe from 
1000-1300A.D. By the publication of Dante’s Inferno Hell was ingrained on the medieval thinkers 
mind. However, the existence of Hell and the condition of eternal damnation presented an 
ongoing debate, concerning the goodness of a God who could forsake some of his children. Eternal 
damnation is the main point of difference between the Buddhist and Latinate Christian 
imaginaires and will have a significant impact as to how my typology of infelicities is formed.  
The advent of Purgatory created another post-mortem infelicity fate. However, this 
particular fate was unusual in that it was not permanent, like that of Heaven or Hell, but rather, 
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was a liminal place before entry into either Heaven or Hell. Like the fate of a rebirth as a preta or 
an animal, Purgatory, I believe,  was a fate that many believed they would encounter, and thus it 
proved particularly useful in regards to maintaining Church power through economic gain. It was 
also a significant financial contributor to the political elite. In a sense Purgatory is very similar to 
Buddhist infelicities, as it not a permanent state, it also was arguably the post-mortem state that 
was of most benefit to the elite, in that its impermanence required methods for acceptance into 
Heaven, and the purchase of indulgences was one method propagated extensively by the Church.  
Another significant discovery to emerge in this comparative study is the parallelism of sins. 
I argue that this is particularly important in asking or examining the question of Agraria, and 
particularly the types of behaviour that Agrarian societies condoned. A survey of such behaviours 
is likely to be able to provide us with evidence as to how the Agrarian elite maintained power, and 
the previous and present societal threats they perceived to be destabilising. The above discussion 
of Hell in the Latinate Christian imaginaire has provided a wider context for the construction of a 
typology of infelicities in Agraria, which is the task I turn to next. 
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Chapter 6: Infelicities in Agraria 
 
Thinking about infelicities and how we talk about infelicities 
 
In this Chapter, I would like to consider a few terms or categories which I argue can be 
useful in thinking about infelicities in Agrarian societies. In this chapter I will discuss how the 
comparative component of this thesis leads to a typology in the loosest sense of the word about 
infelicities in Agraria. Collins in ‘Nirvana...’ claims his study is of use to Religious Studies outside 
of the field of Buddhology, and he intended for his typology to be applicable to other Agrarian 
models of felicity. This chapter will discuss ways in which scholarship can think and talk about 
infelicities, based on my study of the Buddhist and Christian imaginaires. The terms and concepts 
I will discuss are hierarchy, time, dystopia and symbolic violence which will lead to a series of 
discussions on whether we should reconsider the governing structure outlined by Collins as more 
complex than he planned out in ‘Nirvana...’. The final section in this discussion will consider 
historical violence in the Buddhist tradition and whether this violence is a result of  the symbolic 
violence found in the imagery of the Buddhist rebirth destinies. This section is somewhat 
speculative, and aims mainly to consider one of the possible applications of this thesis.  
 
Hierarchy 
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  Initially, I began this thesis by considering Buddhist infelicities in the Agrarian period. In 
my first chapter I stated that perhaps the easiest manner in which to think about infelicities of the 
Buddhist imaginaire, is as a hierarchy. I argue hierarchy is one of the key concepts  for thinking 
about infelicities but also for the entire Agrarian system.  
  Sin or  types of behaviour that lead to post-mortem suffering are hierarchically arranged, 
based on their potential to be corrosive to society and the stabilisation of that society. Behaviour 
that is considered more destabilising or corrosive to society arguably resulted in more significant 
post-mortem punishment. 
I further argue a mirror exists in the Buddhist and Christian cosmoses, as almost every sin 
found in Buddhist literature pertaining to Hell is found in Christian literature. To an extent that it 
may be argued that these two societies had similar characteristics, particularly in reference to post-
mortem fates. Particular behaviours and characters are located in particular post-mortem fates 
which compose the entire geography of the cosmos. Behaviours or characteristics are almost 
always hierarchically arranged, starting from the most minor of sins, at times known as  ignorant 
sins to the absolute worst sins, known as mortal or immediate sins.  
 The Buddhist imaginaire presents three infelicitous rebirth destinies. However, as I have 
argued, there is a hierarchy to these rebirths: rebirth is an animal is the least infelicitous, whereas 
rebirth in Hell is a very infelicitous fate. In my description of the three infelicitous rebirths, I 
described the types of behaviours or actions listed in Buddhist literature. Both the animal and peta 
realms are associated with ‘personality traits’, as opposed to actual actions which are more 
detrimental to society. The animal realm tends to be associated with people who have strong 
attachments to their family, or display personality traits that can be characterised by a particular 
animal. Sentient beings who suffer being reborn peta do so primarily for being greedy, or for 
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failing to provide charity. What is evident about these first two rebirth destinies is they are 
concerned with behaviours that are considered unsavoury rather than damaging to society or the 
ruling elite. Those who are reborn in the Buddhist hells suffer because their sins are divisive or 
likely to cause great harm to others, or society. An example of this is ‘Raurava’, or Great Screaming 
Hell which is for those that use intoxicants to manipulate others.283 As the Buddhist hells descend, 
they are for more divisive actions such as lying, or having false views. The Buddhist hells conclude 
with the five sins of immediate retribution that lead to rebirth in Avīci. These five sins are all 
related to the premeditated murder of specific persons i.e., parents, arhats etc. I argue that the sins 
that result in the most severe punishment are sins that are socially divisive and disruptive to the 
ruling structure of the elite. In both the Buddhist and Christian cases the most significant of sins 
are those which are destructive to the family unit, the religious community, or both units. Both 
imaginaires list the premeditated murder of one’s parents and religious figures as a sin that results 
in post-mortem punishment in the deepest realms of Hell(s). Harming doctrine and the 
destruction of religious artefacts along with the slander of a prophet features as one of the worst 
sins, in both the Buddhist and Christian traditions. 
 The Christian imaginaire presents two infelicitous post-mortem fates, Hell proper and 
Purgatory. In this study, I have only been able to consider Hell proper in detail. However, what I 
initially observed is because the Christian imaginaire is limited in its range of infelicities, it does 
not seem to punish minor sins to the extent that Buddhism does, or rather, its solution for minor 
sins is Purgatory. By minor sins, I refer to undesirable behaviours, or personality traits such as 
greed. That is not to say that Christianity does not punish behavioural traits like greed, but rather, 
that because there is a limited range of infelicities, perhaps more minor acts do not receive as 
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severe post-mortem punishment. In contrast, descriptions of the Buddhist infelicitous realms 
always provide explanations for the sinners suffering. Often the sins described seem very minor in 
comparison to the punishment, for example one off offences of stealing or the sale of intoxicants 
still result in severe punishments in the Buddhist imaginaire. While one cannot rely solely on the 
literary evidence of the time, as the consensus of belief amongst the populace, I argue that the 
hierarchical system of sins is able to be expanded and condensed, based upon the multiplicity of 
infelicities. Perhaps the expansion of an imaginaire and hierarchy of sin occurs in correlation, with 
new tortures thought up as new post-mortem threats in the form of socially corrosive behaviour 
appear. 
Hierarchy is not only a feature in the ‘geography’ of Hell when thinking about 
punishments and how sins are arranged relating to punishment. Hierarchy, I argue, further serves 
as a feature which separates elite and non-elite. This is not a particularly strong feature in 
Christian and Buddhist infelicities. However, I think that in understanding the structure of 
Agrarian societies as bipartite or tripartite class systems, hierarchy is an important identifier of 
power in the post-mortem rebirths or fates. This thesis has focused on infelicities in the Buddhist 
and Christian imaginaires. However, I believe it is likely this power dynamic also exists in the 
felicitous post-mortem realms. I argue this is a feature, as throughout accounts of the post-mortem 
infelicitous worlds, there is evidence of specific places for kings and other elites. It would seem 
that it is particularly bad to be a bad king, more so than it is to be a bad commoner. This is 
evident especially in the Christian context as Tundale’s vision exemplifies terrible kings and their 
fates, it would seem then that division between the elite and non-elite does exist to in the afterlife. 
I think this is a particularly interesting feature, as often afterlife descriptions tend to emphasize 
equality after death, with judgement resting on actions rather than status. I argue that perhaps 
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social status does matter, not only in that certain literary accounts were aimed at the elite or non-
elite, or that particular places existed for the elite, especially for those that had failed to do their 
duty. 
   Another way in which social status and hierarchy in life affects one’s post-mortem fate is 
that actions are not the sole determiner for one’s post-mortem fate. I make this claim based on the 
presence of puñña and the sale and purchase of indulgences. Wealth and leisure time that was 
unique to the elite, was an advantage in determining an individual’s post-mortem fate, as they 
were able to purchase puñña and indulgences, and spend time engaging in religious acts that were 
able to improve their post-mortem fate.  
 Arguably, amongst all imaginaires, a type of hierarchy exists, and this hierarchy likely 
expands as the imaginaire grows. As the hierarchy of punishments and ranking of sins have a 
symbiotic relationship, both determine the other, which in turn can be considered a mirror of 
Agrarian societies, albeit a somewhat distorted one. In a society in which hierarchy and a class 
system emerged, it seems likely that such hierarchies would be found throughout Agraria not only 
in the physical structure, but in the imaginings of other worlds.  
 
 
Time (and soteriology)  
 
Another key feature of the Buddhist and Christian imaginaires is how time is 
conceptualised and particularly thoughts about those that cannot be saved, whether it is the 
Buddhist icchantikas or the concept of eternal damnation in Christianity. 
The best way to conceptualise how time fits into the narrative of post-mortem infelicities 
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in the Buddhist and Christian imaginaires is to think about punishment and time spent being 
punished as erasing or removing sin. This works particularly well in thinking about the Buddhist 
system of hells and Christian Purgatory. However, early Christian imaginings of Hell often offered 
methods in which relatives were able to save family members from Hell, or penance resulted in 
future entry into the Kingdom of Heaven.  
In the Buddhist case, this proposed equation is particularly evident, as many descriptions 
of the Buddhist hells describe in some detail the amount of time each sinner must be punished for 
in order to atone for their sins. There is a particular sense of cleansing through post-mortem 
punishment and time in Buddhism, which is dictated by the Buddhist world order. This is in 
contrast to Christianity, which appears to have alternative and conflicting ideas concerning time 
spent in Hell for sins. In some sense Christianity does not have an as clear hierarchy of sins, given 
that all sinners in Hell are punished for eternity. Rather, the Christian imaginaire relies on torture 
as its primary method of punishment. However, at times, punishments arguably become more 
severe in the Christian imaginaire. Therefore, it seems the equation of time plus punishment does 
not result in the cleansing of sin in the Christian imaginaire. 
  Time is also a key concept in understanding the limits of soteriology in a religion. Time 
also offers insight into the particular narratives that restrain the limits of felicity and infelicity type 
structures. As Collins argues in ‘Nirvana...’ the Pali Buddhist imaginaire is centered on Nirvana as 
the ultimate felicity. As I have discussed above, Nirvana is a closure point and the only place of 
permanence in the Buddhist imaginaire. Having only one end point, which is arguably very 
difficult to achieve, allows for an infinite number of rebirths and the potential for an infinite 
number of post-mortem fates opening up the cosmos for continued expansion of the felicity and 
infelicity structure. The Christian imaginaire has two closure points, both of which are final: the 
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felicitous fate of Heaven, in which one enjoys the pleasures of Heaven and the grace of God 
eternally; and the infelicitous fate of Hell and being tortured eternally. Because the Christian 
imaginaire has two closure points, both which are final, it is limited in its range of post-mortem 
fates. As both closure points are eternal, the Christian imaginaire places limitations on an 
individual's reality. As a result,  I argue that narrative in the Christian imaginaire is very limited, 
while details of felicity and infelicity can be developed, there is little potential for new post-
mortem fates to be added to the Christian imaginaire. Arguably, the fact that there is limit of only 
one life on earth, and eternal life either in Heaven or Hell places a particularly narrative on an 
individual's life, and I argue this divides people into ‘good’ and ‘bad’.  
 Due to the constraints of time on an imaginaire, infelicitous post-mortem fates may have 
become significantly prominent in the Christian and Buddhist imaginaires. I argue that this is 
perhaps more likely in the Christian imaginaire. I make this claim based upon the fact that eternal 
damnation created more terror than any earthly punishment, and therefore, was likely useful as a 
tool in stabilizing society by providing a very real and frightening disincentive for socially corrosive 
behaviour.  
 The final implication of time for the concept of the imaginaire and Agrarian felicity and 
infelicity structures is that the concept of eternity, I believe, places limits on the abilities of a 
saviour. Eternal damnation and the beings known as icchantikas are examples of the limitations of 
a religions soteriology. In stating that some beings are unable to be saved, both Christianity and 
Buddhism state that their saviours are limited. I believe this suggests that there were perhaps 
groups within the Christian and Buddhist society that were so outside of society that they could 
not be included in the imaginaire and thus were banished or exiled. It may be of use in further 
studies to consider the potential histories of such societies which led to concepts like icchantikas 
96 
or eternal damnation, and whether significant events occurred during these histories that led to 
the development of such ideas.  
 Overall, time does appear to be part of the equation in understanding infelicity systems in 
Agraria, as it is a signifier of sin given we can understand the severity of sin based on punishment 
and time. However, the concept of time is largely defined by the narrative of a religion, whether it 
is closed or open. We must also consider concepts like that of the icchantika and eternal 
damnation when discussing time in relation to infelicities. Time, however, is not something that 
can be asserted as the norm as its function in relation to infelicities, as permanent and 
impermanent infelicity states exist in the Buddhist and Christian imaginaires. 
 
Symbolic Violence 
 
Steven Collins argues in ‘Nirvana...’ that violence was a tool used by the elite to maintain 
power in the Agrarian system. However, I argue that the violence of post-mortem infelicities is a 
particular type of violence that serves the elite in maintaining power. The violence committed in 
the infelicitous post-mortem realms is often of a level unseen or done in this world. In this section 
on symbolic violence, I intend to discuss two features of symbolic violence, how it serves a 
maintenance tool, and also how symbolic violence reconfigures Collins’s model of governance in 
Agraria. 
 Violence is difficult to define and we often only consider violence to be physical acts. 
However, Mary Jackman’s definition of violence, I argue, is much more useful in thinking about 
violence, particularly violence undertaken by the state. Mary Jackman argues that ‘violence 
encompasses actions that inflict, threaten, or cause injury’. Violent actions, she continues, may be 
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‘corporal, written or verbal and the injuries may be corporal, psychological, material or social.’284 
John R. Hall further suggests that perhaps we should consider violence ‘as a larger panoply of 
antagonistic and aggressive actions’.285 Arguably, the violent imagery of post-mortem realms serves 
a purpose in the maintenance of the social order, in that it discourages socially corrosive behaviour 
through symbolic violence. The violent imagery of the post-mortem realms poses a significant 
threat to those that are subject to the Buddhist and Christian imaginaires. This symbolic violence 
arguably causes psychological injury in the sense that it is frightening to the viewer and as a result 
impacts their behaviour. This would have been particularly true of children who were introduced 
to such imagery, or perhaps even the illiterate who had limited understanding of post-mortem 
fates outside of what they saw or was read to them. Georges Sorel argued in 1950 that an 
‘established social order marshals considerable capacities for the exercise of authority, force and 
violence’ as such we can understand the founding and maintenance of Agraria as based on 
violence, be it actual or symbolic.286 The capacity for violence, and the need of the ruling elite to 
maintain society as class divisions and poverty increased created the perfect arena for symbolic 
violence to be utilised by the elite to maintain authority.  
  Symbolic violence was not only useful in the maintenance of society through psychological 
warfare, but was also able to legitimize actual violence.287 In the case of the Buddhist and Christian 
imaginaires, governing bodies were legitimated and sanctified by the religious order. In supporting 
regimes that employ violence not against just their own people but against other nation-states, the 
religious order is supporting violence regardless of its own beliefs concerning violence.288 Hall 
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claims that ideology is used to either explain away violence or to abhor violence as a deviant 
aberration.289 This is a very interesting claim regarding the legitimisation of violence in both the 
Buddhist and Christian imaginaires. In the case of the Buddhist imaginaire, I argue that the 
religious elite, while they do sanctify and legitimate state violence through their support for the 
governing body and symbolic violence, still are able to distance themselves from violence. In 
distancing themselves from real-world violence, the religious elite appear to abhor violence, and in 
a sense cloak Buddhism as the ‘peaceful religion’ it has often been viewed as. However, as I argue 
in the following section, on re-imagining of the governance of Agraria that symbolic violence was 
more threatening than the actual violence committed by the state. Christianity in contrast to 
Buddhism has historically been more explicit in its threat of violence or perhaps more apt in its 
justification of violence in the name of Christ as a method for conquest and organization of 
society. However, I do believe in some sense the Christian religious orders still managed to 
segregate themselves from violence and maintain a gentle image for the Church.  
In another direction, I would like to consider whether symbolic violence or violence found 
in the post-mortem worlds can be considered more legitimate given the fact it is divine. In a sense 
it may be more just than actual wordly violence, given that all will suffer the same punishment for 
the same sin. The violence of the post-mortem worlds in a sense provided justice for those who 
felt they had been wronged by the worldly justice system, and perhaps is another way in which 
symbolic violence served as a stabiliser of society. The violence of the infelicitous post-mortem 
realms provided ultimate justice in a manner that governing bodies could not, therefore equalising 
the populace through the divine and thus maintaining society. 
Symbolic violence in the post mortem worlds served three purposes in the governance of 
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Agraria. The first function of symbolic violence was an ongoing threat to the populace, which I 
argue likely caused enough psychological injury to believers that as a result influenced their 
behaviour towards that which was socially acceptable. A secondary function of symbolic violence, I 
argue, is that symbolic violence legitimates state violence, in that violent imagery can lead too and 
legitimate violence. The last function of symbolic violence I have considered in this section is 
whether symbolic violence may have been considered more just, given its divine nature and as a 
result may have also acted as a stabiliser for the maintenance of society. 
 
 
Re-imagining the governance of Agraria 
 
 In ‘Nirvana...’ Collins argues there are two major groups that make up the ruling elite, 
‘legitimators’, who are the religious elite, and the ‘thugs’, the ruling elite. In this structure, the 
‘thugs’ or the ruling elite are those who wield the hypothetical sticks, in that they are the ones who 
preside over the earthly courts and employ violence against the populace. In contrast to the ruling 
elite, the ‘legitimators’, the religious elite composed of the monastic order, the priestly caste and 
other religious figures hold the so-called carrots. The carrots are the felicities of the Buddhist and 
Christian imaginaires. According to Collins the religious elite, controlled the felicities and to an 
extent granted them, based on their specific knowledge which they shared with the non-elite, to 
enable them to access post-mortem reward. Based upon Collins’s model, each group presides over 
only one set of stabilisers. However, in this thesis I have considered infelicities, and I argue that 
the proposed model of governance of Agraria requires alteration.  
  The Buddhist religious elite and Buddhism itself appear not to be connected to real-world 
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violence. However, the religious elite in the Buddhist world, and, arguably, of the Christian world, 
are very much connected with symbolic violence. The legitimators of Agraria, as the creators and 
maintainers of symbolic violence in the infelicities, commit violence on the populace. It may not 
be direct physical violence, but rather, symbolic violence which is a serious type of violence spread 
through violent speech and ongoing psychological violence. Symbolic violence is particularly 
unusual, because of its creators and position and connection with the divine or governing world 
order it is a type of legitimated violence utilised by the state. Symbolic violence can be employed 
by the state for political control, and arguably infelicities can be considered a type of ideological 
violence which is used as an instrument of control in the maintenance of society. Not only does 
the study of Buddhist infelicities re-imagine Collins’s governance of Agraria as a much more 
complex structure in which the labels of legitimators and thugs must be abandoned due to each 
group controlling both incentives and disincentives, one of the earthly kind, the other divine. The 
study of Buddhist infelicities also illuminates Buddhism’s history of violence, which may have 
implications for other studies concerning Buddhist violence. Below is a small section on the 
potential implications of this connection. 
 
 
A history of violence 
 
 It is evident from my study that Buddhism has a long history with violent imagery, even if 
not with physical violence, although throughout its history and in the present Buddhism has 
engaged in violence, e.g. in the anti-Tamil case. Buddhism has a history of symbolic and 
psychological violence in the form of infelicities, given Buddhist infelicities are incredibly violent 
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and were utilised as a tool in maintaining society. Violent infelicities have long been a fundamental 
part of Buddhism, as evidenced by the Kathāvatthu debates concerning hell in the 2nd century 
and the publication of the Petavatthu. Due to Buddhism’s longstanding involvement in political 
and symbolic violence, it seems that at times Buddhism has engaged with real-world political 
violence on the basis of textual violence. The Buddhist religious elite’s connection with symbolic 
violence that they are able to manipulate allows them on occasion to engage in real-world political 
violence, on the grounds that such violence serves Buddhism. 
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Conclusion 
 
 In summary, in this thesis, I have argued that a set of infelicities constituted a significant 
part of the Buddhist imaginaire, and that the infelicitous dimension of the Buddhist imaginare was 
instrumental in maintaining society. I have further expanded upon this initial argument to include 
another imaginaire, the Latinate Christian imaginaire. In this case, too, I focused upon the 
inclusion of a rich set of infelicities, to argue that it is likely that all Agrarian imaginaires contained 
a set of infelicities.  
 Part I outlined a set of three Buddhist infelicities: all post-mortem fates: rebirth as animal; 
rebirth as a peta; and rebirth in the Buddhist hells.            
  In Chapter 1, I argued that rebirth as an animal was the least infelicitous of these three 
rebirth destinies. However, it was still frightening enough to act as a disincentive for socially 
corrosive behaviour. I argued that animal rebirth was the least infelicitous infelicity, because the 
type of suffering that occurs in the animal realm is much less severe than in the other rebirth 
destinies; and because of the behaviour or sins that result in rebirth as an animal. Those reborn as 
animals were guilty of particularly unsavoury personality traits, as opposed to particular actions, as 
exemplified by those reborn as snakes due to anger.  
  In Chapter 2, I surveyed rebirth as peta. Peta are perhaps the most fascinating rebirth fate 
to the non-Buddhist, as they are a particularly unusual, half-human, ghost-like creature. Petas have 
been a source of interest to academics since Feer’s description in 1884. However, as I have shown, 
petas are not as simple as Feer’s early description, and ongoing studies have shown that even 
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images of peta are complex. In my study of peta rebirth, I attempted to describe the various forms 
of peta, which I argued may be linked to their origin in Vedic cosmology. I first examined basic 
questions: What or who are peta? Where do they exist? I then used literary evidence, particularly 
the Petavatthu, as well as images of peta, to demonstrate that rebirth as a peta was a significant 
part of the Buddhist imaginaire. Finally, I discussed the work of Jeffrey Shirkey on peta and ‘moral 
economy’, particularly the way in which the ruling elite have employed the notion of peta for 
financial gain, as an incentive for gifts to the sangha. Peta, I argued, presented a very frightening 
post-mortem fate to the Buddhist laity, and that threat was very real to the majority of Buddhist 
believers. I also observed that like rebirth as animal, rebirth as a peta was occasioned primarily by 
unsavoury character traits, rather than specific acts.  
  In Chapter 3, I examined the final and most infelicitous of the Buddhist rebirths, rebirth in 
one of the many Buddhist hells as a hell-being. After discussing the origin and complex history of 
Buddhist hells, I sketched out the standard system of eight hells, based on the Saddharma-
smṛtyupasthāna-sūtra. This shows how complex the system of hells was, and the amount of detail 
that Buddhist thinkers went into when imagining such post-mortem fates. The evidence of this 
section shows that Buddhist infelicities have a long and complex history. This supports one of the 
central claims of this thesis as a whole, namely, that the Buddhist infelicities always constituted a 
significant part of the Buddhist imaginaire as a whole. To support even further my claim that hell 
played a significant part in the system of infelicities, I also briefly discussed how hells have been 
transformed over culture and time.  
 In a brief Appendix to Chapter 3, I conducted a small study of the beings known as 
icchantikas. Arguably, although icchantika status is not a rebirth destiny, it is an infelicitous state. 
Icchantikas also provide a point of comparison with the Christian concept of eternal damnation 
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and the problem of those who cannot be saved.  
  My survey of the Buddhist infelicities concludes that infelicities were a significant feature 
of the Buddhist imaginaire. Infelicities were not only present in the Buddhist imaginaire but 
constituted a portion of literature and other media which was available and often regularly 
presented to the laity by the monastics. As a result, I argue that not only were Buddhist infelicities 
a significant part of the imaginaire, but that like felicities they served a purpose of maintaining 
Agrarian society.  
  In the section concerning each of these rebirth destinies, I provided substantial evidence as 
to why they must be considered part of the Buddhist imaginare. I hope to have shown that 
infelicities in the Buddhist imaginaire constitute a rich and complex system, and have been a 
significant part of Buddhist cosmologies since the beginnings of Buddhism, as is demonstrated by 
debates concerning hell, and texts like the Petavatthu. The infelicities of the Buddhist imaginaire 
have flourished and expanded over time and culture, providing evidence that they were not a 
minor part of particular Buddhist traditions, but were found throughout the Buddhist world. My 
detailed discussions of the Buddhist infelicities provide ample evidence that they should be 
included in Collins’s proposed theory of the Agrarian imaginaire. Infelicities constituted a 
significant part of Buddhist literature, and images of such rebirth destinies are also found 
throughout the Buddhist world, be they paintings, carvings or other architectural features.  
  The tradition thus contained a wealth of information on Buddhist infelicities, and much of 
this information was available to the laity, not only in visual form, but also in spoken form, as in 
the tales of the Petavatthu, and other popular tales of hell such as the classic Mulian. I have 
argued that infelicities were used in the Buddhist imaginaire as a device to achieve and maintain 
social stability, based upon the prevalence of information on Buddhist infelicities; the fact that 
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they were discussed in relation to socially corrosive behaviours; and the fact that they were 
presented to the laity in stories and images. All of the infelicitous fates in the Buddhist imaginaire 
are linked to a particular undesirable behaviour or personality trait. Given the prevalence of 
Buddhist infelicities, the incredibly detailed and complex worldview they constitute, and their 
purpose as a moralising tool, there is strong reason to include them in Collins’s proposed theory of 
the Buddhist imaginaire. 
  In Part II, I undertook a comparative study of Christian infelicities, during what I classified 
as the Latinate period, or pre-Reformation Christianity. In this section, I argued that much like 
Buddhist infelicities, Christian infelicities should be considered an integral part of the Christian 
imaginaire, serving a similar function to the Buddhist infelicities in that they provided a 
disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour. In this section, it was also my intention to show that 
similarities exist between the infelicities of two very differing religious systems, so that the theory 
of the religious imaginaire may be of more general use to analyses of religion.  
 I argued that the Christian system is smaller and slightly less complex than the Buddhist 
system, and the primary infelicity identified in the Christian imaginaire is Hell proper. As with 
Buddhist hells, I began my section on Christian Hell by sketching the history of Christian Hell, 
and its emergence from the Jewish Gehenna. I then considered the punishments found in 
Christian Hell and the reasons for such punishments, and in order to make the claim that 
infelicities functioned as a disincentive or socially corrosive behaviour; any unsavoury behaviour 
must be linked to an infelicity. This section provided insight into the types of sin that resulted in 
post-mortem punishment, and led to the observation that the Buddhist and Christian imaginaires 
shared many similarities in regards to sin. In order to claim that Hell was a significant part of the 
Christian imaginaire that continued to evolve over time and culture, I also briefly surveyed a 
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variety of visions of Hell, beginning with St. Peter’s Apocalypse and ending with Dante’s Inferno. 
This section demonstrated that various images of Hell developed over the centuries, and showed 
the elaborate detail Christian thinkers went into when creating images of Hell.   
  The final two sections of my study of Christian Hell attempted to understand two 
specifically Christian concepts: first, sin; and second, eternal damnation. I surveyed the range of 
sins listed in the Christian imaginaire and how they developed and shifted status over time. This 
also led to a consideration of whether Hell and sin expand together, as part of the same larger 
dynamic. The second of these concepts, that of eternal damnation, presented a significant 
challenge. My survey of the notion of eternal damnation led to the conclusion that narrative and 
time are extremely important in thinking about infelicities. I utilised this survey, and my earlier 
discussion of icchantikas from Chapter 3, in a later section of this thesis concerning time and 
soteriology. 
  Hell proper in the Christian sense, much like the infelicities of the Buddhist imaginaire, is 
a complex and multifaceted place. Over the centuries, Hell underwent significant changes, as 
Christian thinkers dreamt ever-more terrifying post-mortem punishments. Not only was Hell a 
significant part of the Christian imaginaire, it also served the same function as the Buddhist 
infelicities, in that Hell served as a disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour. I argued this point 
on the basis of the correlation between particular sins and punishments found in Hell.  
   The second infelicity that I considered in my study of Christian infelicities was Purgatory, 
though it is not entirely infelicitous. Purgatory is secondary to Hell, as it is only a temporary state. 
I began my study of Purgatory with a brief history and an investigation into the origins and the 
way Christian thinkers rationalised the inclusion of Purgatory given it is a recent development in 
comparison to Hell. Because of this, Purgatory was surrounded by debates, from its geographical 
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location to the actualities of Purgatory. Over the development of Purgatory it was affirmed that 
Purgatory was closer to Hell and much the same of Hell in regard to punishments. Purgatory also 
served a very useful function through the sale of indulgences which provided significant economic 
gain for the ruling elite. Indulgences were able to be readily sold, as Purgatory much like rebirth as 
an animal or rebirth as a peta was a very real threat, in that it was likely that almost every person 
would experience Purgatory. In some sense I argue that perhaps rebirth as a peta and Purgatory 
can be thought of as very similar in the sense that both frightened the populace into behaving in a 
way that was not only socially acceptable but also beneficial to the ruling elite. Purgatory like Hell 
proper provided a very real threat to the Christian laity, and was instrumental in maintaining 
stability in the Christian Agrarian world.  
 Hell and Purgatory as infelicities of the Christian imaginaire like Buddhist infelicities 
constituted a significant part of the Christian imaginaire. The complexity and the detail of such 
infelicities as well as the debates surrounding them shows the length that Christian thinkers went 
to in order to create such worlds. Therefore, Christian infelicities were not only a significant part 
of the Christian imaginaire, but they served the same function as Buddhist infelicities in providing 
a disincentive for socially corrosive behaviour; they were also instrumental in maintaining society. 
 The final section of this thesis discussed ways in which I think it can be useful to think 
about infelicities, or similarities that I have identified in both the Buddhist and Christian 
imaginaires. 
   I began this section by reflecting on hierarchy, as hierarchy I argue is the point most 
central to infelicities in the sense that they are hierarchically ranked. I have claimed that hierarchy 
is determinative in the study of infelicities, as infelicities, behaviour or sins and even the 
geography of infelicities is ordered by a hierarchy. I made the further claim that hierarchy in the 
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post-mortem infelicitous worlds is perhaps a reflection of the hierarchies found in Agraria, and it 
makes sense that this would occur given our tendency to construct what we know. 
 As stated above, my studies of icchantikas and the Christian concept of eternal damnation 
provided the basis for a discussion of time and soteriology. My first consideration of time, is that 
time is very useful in thinking about sin and punishment particular how time can lead to an 
understanding of severity of sin, though in the Christian case, this is arguably complicated 
somewhat by the doctrine of eternal damnation. Following this, I made the claim that time is key 
in understanding the narrative and soteriology of a religion, in the sense that only one closed 
ending leads to multiple paths whereas two closed ends constrain the imaginaire. Time also 
provides a consideration of the limits of a saviour, and I argue that perhaps an important next step 
in such research would be to look at how narrative, time and history alter a saviour’s ability and 
the post-mortem fates of believers. 
 In another direction, I considered symbolic violence, particularly when thinking about an 
imaginaire’s function of managing the Agrarian populace through fear of post-mortem retribution. 
I argued that we need to think of violence as much more complex than that of just the physical 
violence of the state and that the infelicitous realms and the propagation of such worlds did a 
psychological violence on the populace. Thinking about symbolic violence also opens up discussion 
as to how a religious group legitimates actual violence through symbolic violence and the support 
of a regime's violence. The last claim I made in relation to symbolic violence was that perhaps 
symbolic violence and the violence of the post-mortem realms was considered justified because it 
was divine and administered by the religious authority.  
 Symbolic violence and the administration of such violence by the monastic order requires a 
reconfiguration of the proposed Agrarian structure Collins argued for in ‘Nirvana...’. I claim in this 
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section that perhaps we should consider the system more complex than just ‘legitimators’ and 
‘thugs’. The ruling elite, composed of the priestly and the dynastic offer both hypothetical ‘carrots’ 
and ‘sticks’ to the populace, neither body holds precedence over one or another.  
  My last consideration in this section on how we can think about infelicities is whether 
symbolic violence has any significance on actual Buddhist violence. I claimed in this section that 
due to Buddhism’s long history with violence, in the sense of symbolic violence, that the Buddhist 
monastic order is in fact engaging in violence and in a sense condoning it.   
  Although I have already considered ways in which this thesis and the study of infelicities 
can be expanded, the following two points I was not able to elaborate on due to the limitations of 
this thesis.  
In future studies, it would be of interest to consider the advent of infelicities by date, to 
hypothesize as Jens Braarvig suggests whether Buddhist hells can be considered the first hells. 
Based upon my study of Buddhist and Christian hells, it is arguable that Buddhist hells emerged 
prior to the advent of Christianity. In other words, we should investigate whether Hell is a 
Buddhist or Eastern concept that spread across the Middle East, where it was reimagined in 
Christianity as a Christian concept. A history of hells throughout the religious world would offer 
an insight into societies and the similarities and differences they shared as they developed over 
history.  
I would also like to state that there was no room in this thesis to prove that infelicities 
were more important than felicities in the governance of Agraria. In this study I merely sought to 
illustrate that infelicities were a significant part of both the Buddhist and Christian imaginaires. In 
further studies it may be of use to consider how Agrarian societies utilised both felicities and 
infelicities as stabilisers, and whether one set was more effective than the other.  
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 In sum, I have claimed that infelicities of the Buddhist and Christian imaginaires 
constituted a significant part of each religion's ideology. Steven Collins’s argument should be 
revised to include infelicities as part of the imaginaire, not only due to the mere fact that ideas 
about these infelicities exist, but also because infelicities served the same purpose as that which he 
proposed for felicities. Infelicities exist alongside felicities, providing a set of imagined post-
mortem fates that provide a stabilizer for Agrarian society.  
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